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Pennoyer Was Right 
Stephen E. Sachs* 
Pennoyer v. Neff has a bad rap.  As an original matter, Pennoyer is legally 
correct.  Compared to current doctrine, it offers a more coherent and attractive 
way to think about personal jurisdiction and interstate relations generally. 
To wit: The Constitution imposes no direct limits on personal jurisdiction.  
Jurisdiction isn’t a matter of federal law, but of general law—that unwritten law, 
including much of the English common law and the customary law of nations, 
that formed the basis of the American legal system.  Founding-era states were 
free to override that law and to exercise more expansive jurisdiction.  But if they 
did, their judgments wouldn’t be recognized elsewhere, in other states or in 
federal courts—any more than if they’d tried to redraw their borders. 
As Pennoyer saw, the Fourteenth Amendment changed things by enabling 
direct federal review of state judgments, rather than making parties wait to 
challenge them at the recognition stage.  It created a federal question of what 
had been a general one: whether a judgment was issued with jurisdiction, full 
stop, such that the deprivation of property or liberty it ordered would be done 
with due process of law. 
Reviving Pennoyer would make modern doctrine make more sense.  As 
general-law principles, not constitutional decrees, jurisdictional doctrines could 
be adjusted by international treaty—or overridden through Congress’s 
enumerated powers.  The Due Process Clause gives these rules teeth without 
determining their content, leaving space for federal rules to govern our federal 
system. 
In the meantime, courts facing jurisdictional questions should avoid pitched 
battles between “sovereignty” and “liberty,” looking instead to current 
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conventions of general and international law.  Pennoyer’s reasoning can be right 
without International Shoe’s outcome being wrong; international law and 
American practice might just be different now than they were in 1878 or 1945. 
But if not, at least we’ll be looking in the right place.  General law may not 
be much, but it’s something: the conventional settlement of the problems of 
political authority at the root of any theory of personal jurisdiction.  Recovering 
those conventions is not only useful for its own sake, but a step toward 
appreciating our deep dependence on shared traditions of general law. 
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Introduction 
This Article addresses the “central mystery”1 of Pennoyer v. Neff2: what 
does due process have to do with jurisdiction?3 
Pennoyer is mysterious in more than one way.  How do Fourteenth 
Amendment protections against the power of any state allocate power among 
particular states?  Why would a guarantee of “liberty interest[s]”4 act “as an 
instrument of interstate federalism”?5  Is it even worth having a “liberty” to 
be sued in California but not in Oregon? 
As it happens, these questions were answered in Pennoyer, more or less 
correctly.  And those answers may help us solve other legal puzzles—of 
procedure, of interstate relations, and of the nature of our federal system. 
Today, Pennoyer has a bad rap.  Every fall, it frustrates a new generation 
of law students, who revile it almost as much as their professors do.  At best, 
it’s seen as a relic, long ago cast aside by International Shoe v. Washington.6  
At worst, it’s dismissed as a nineteenth-century dogma or a Lochner7-era 
power grab.  To its critics, Pennoyer is “unsupported,”8 “unsound,”9 or “dead 
 
1. Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From 
Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 38 (1990). 
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
3. See generally Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1071 (1994) (suggesting that the answer is very little). 
4. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982). 
5. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). 
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
7. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state labor laws under 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
8. Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical 
Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1125 (1981). 
9. Robert H. Abrams & Paul R. Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control 
of State Court Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REV. 75, 76 (1984). 
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wrong”;10 an “err[or]”11 and a “misinterpretation”;12 “anachronistic,” 
“spurious,” “shallowly reasoned and conceptually confused”;13 a decision 
that “arouses dismay and even despair.”14 
That derision is a mistake.  As an original matter, Pennoyer is legally 
correct.  While its language may seem archaic, its reasoning shouldn’t.  
Compared to current doctrine, it offers a more coherent and attractive way to 
think about personal jurisdiction and about interstate relations generally. 
To understand why, though, we first have to abandon what many see as 
the main holding of Pennoyer: that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause—“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law”15—imposes rules for personal jurisdiction.  In 
fact, the Constitution imposes no direct limits on personal jurisdiction at all.  
Personal jurisdiction isn’t a matter of constitutional law, or even of federal 
law.  Instead, it’s a matter of general law—that unwritten law, including 
much of the English common law and the customary law of nations, that 
formed the basis of the American legal system and that continues to govern 
unusual corners of the system today.16 
As general law, jurisdiction is something on which different court 
systems can disagree, in much the same way that dictionary editors might 
disagree on questions of conventional usage.  The Constitution takes no 
position on these disagreements; it takes the generally accepted practices as 
it finds them.  It regulates personal jurisdiction not through rules but through 
institutions—declining to provide specific answers in favor of creating a 
neutral forum in which to ask the questions.  Because that forum is federal, 
not state, it can disregard local views that appear to conflict with the general 
rule.  And because the rule is general, not constitutional, Congress might 
potentially displace it by statute—providing federal rules to govern a federal 
system. 
The Founding-era picture was as follows.  In the time of the special 
appearance, personal jurisdiction mattered mostly for recognition.  Instead of 
sending an attorney to a distant court, the best way to dispute jurisdiction was 
 
10. Adrian M. Tocklin, Pennoyer v. Neff: The Hidden Agenda of Stephen J. Field, 28 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 75, 137 (1997). 
11. Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-
Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part One), 14 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 499, 501 (1981) [hereinafter Whitten, Part One]. 
12. Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-
Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part Two), 14 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 735, 840 (1981) [hereinafter Whitten, Part Two]. 
13. Conison, supra note 3, at 1076. 
14. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 
241, 271. 
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
16. See generally Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503 
(2006). 
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often to take a default and live to fight enforcement another day.  A sovereign 
might claim exorbitant jurisdiction in its own courts, executing judgments on 
whatever property it could find.  But when the winner tried to enforce the 
judgment elsewhere, the “foreign” judgment would be held to international 
standards—which were part of the law of nations, which was part of the 
general law. 
For this purpose, other American states were just as “foreign” as distant 
countries.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause,17 together with its implementing 
statute (the 1790 Act),18 didn’t alter the law of jurisdiction, which each state 
court could still enforce.  Even the federal courts held states at a certain arm’s 
length, giving no more weight to laws asserting jurisdiction beyond state 
borders than to laws purporting to redraw those borders themselves.  Before 
Pennoyer, though, these federal views held no special weight; the general law 
they applied wasn’t federal law, and conflicting state judgments couldn’t be 
appealed to federal court. 
The Fourteenth Amendment remade this picture simply by changing the 
route for appeal.  A judgment without jurisdiction was void; its execution 
took away property (or, less commonly, liberty) without due process of law.  
That turned the presence or absence of jurisdiction, full stop, into a matter of 
constitutional concern.  Whether a state court had jurisdiction would be 
answered by other rules; in particular, by general law, of which the Supreme 
Court on writ of error could take its own view.  So instead of waiting for 
collateral attack, defendants could now raise personal jurisdiction directly—
and expect state courts to conform to the federal view of things, on pain of 
being reversed.  Over time, the need for collateral attack faded away, as did 
the memory of the doctrine’s general-law roots.  Personal jurisdiction became 
a subcategory of due process, a matter of “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice”19 and a field of endless dispute. 
Different commentators have all seen different pieces of this puzzle,20 
but no one seems to have fully assembled it, or to have explained why 
 
17. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
18. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012)). 
19. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
20. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 1, at 24, 88 (arguing that “due process” historically “did not 
connote any limitation on personal jurisdiction” and calling on the Court to “get out of the business 
of regulating personal jurisdiction”); Conison, supra note 3, at 1076 (arguing, on similar historical 
grounds, for excising due process from the law of jurisdiction); John B. Oakley, The Pitfalls of 
“Hint and Run” History: A Critique of Professor Borchers’s “Limited View” of Pennoyer v. Neff, 
28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 595 (1995) (criticizing Borchers’s historical account and arguing that 
due process does impose territorial jurisdictional constraints); Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not 
Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1, 7 (2006) (arguing that “sovereignty principles,” and not due process, “are what limit a court’s 
jurisdiction” over foreign defendants); Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due 
Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 499–500 
(1987) [hereinafter Perdue, Scandal] (recounting the history of Pennoyer, and describing its reliance 
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Pennoyer’s solution was the logical response to the questions it faced.  The 
traditional summary of Pennoyer, that the Fourteenth Amendment simply 
included rules of personal jurisdiction as “part of the constitutional 
mandate,”21 is widely (and correctly) viewed as ahistorical.22  In its place has 
emerged a wilderness of theories—that personal jurisdiction is really 
governed by substantive due process,23 or individual fairness,24 or the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause,25 or Lockean notions of consent,26 or federal 
common law.27  Those who emphasize Pennoyer’s dependence on general 
law generally see this as a strike against the doctrine, a reason to “decouple 
the personal jurisdiction analysis from the Constitution altogether.”28 
Yet reviving Pennoyer does more than correct the historical record.  It 
also serves a pressing modern need.  If anything is as unpopular among 
procedure scholars as Pennoyer, it’s the Supreme Court’s decisions since 
 
on due process as “startling”); Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? 
Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 731–32 (2012) 
[hereinafter Perdue, Sovereignty] (presenting a more sophisticated theory of Pennoyer, under which 
due process acts as a “hook” to raise other challenges in state and federal court); Andrew L. Strauss, 
Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law of Personal Jurisdiction in 
Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 415 (1995) (arguing that international law, of its own 
force, constrains domestic jurisdictional law); Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of 
Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 852 (1989) (portraying the law of personal 
jurisdiction as federal common law); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of 
Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 264 (2004) (same); 
Whitten, Part One, supra note 11, at 501 (arguing that Pennoyer’s approach to due process was a 
“doctrinal error”). 
21. Oakley, supra note 20, at 685. 
22. See, e.g., Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of “State Sovereignty” and the Curse of 
Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 704 
(1983); Redish, supra note 8, at 1120–21; Whitten, Part Two, supra note 12, at 818. 
23. See, e.g., Jacob Kreutzer, Incorporating Personal Jurisdiction, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 211 
(2014); see also Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 689, 694 (1987) (describing “a due process right not to be subjected 
to unjustified assertions of state court jurisdiction”); cf. Perdue, Scandal, supra note 20, at 508–09 
(“Just as in Field’s time, personal jurisdiction continues to be treated as a substantive due process 
right.”). 
24. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982) 
(describing limits on personal jurisdiction as “a function of the individual liberty interest preserved 
by the Due Process Clause”); Abrams & Dimond, supra note 9, at 75–76; John N. Drobak, The 
Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1029 (1983); Redish, supra 
note 8, at 1114; Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State 
Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485, 487 (1984). 
25. See Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 796 
(1955); see also Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. 
REV. 529, 564–70 (1991) (suggesting such an approach). 
26. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880–81 (2011) (plurality opinion).  
See generally Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 
257 (1990). 
27. See generally Trangsrud, supra note 20; Weinstein, supra note 20. 
28. Parrish, supra note 20, at 56; accord Borchers, supra note 1, at 105; Conison, supra note 3, 
at 1205.  But see Perdue, Sovereignty, supra note 20, at 743 (suggesting a “doctrinal ‘reset’”). 
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Pennoyer.29  The pitched battles of modern jurisdiction doctrine—between 
“sovereignty” and “liberty,” between “traditional notions” and “substantial 
justice”—haven’t been solved by staring harder at the words “due process of 
law.”  Returning to jurisdiction’s general- and international-law origins might 
help.  Precisely because jurisdiction is a topic in general law, and is only 
enforced through the vehicle of due process, its substance isn’t fixed in 
constitutional amber.  If the rules need improving, Congress has power to 
improve them. 
In the meantime, courts needn’t be left adrift.  Pennoyer’s reasoning can 
be right without International Shoe’s outcome necessarily being wrong.  
International law might just be different now than it was in 1878, or even in 
1945; so might the general law of which it’s a part.  But either way, we’ll be 
looking in the right place.  Courts don’t need to plumb the depths of due 
process or solve all of political philosophy to discern the rules that are 
currently in general application.  General law may not be popular at the 
moment, but it offers something important: a conventional settlement of the 
problems of political authority that personal jurisdiction so obviously raises. 
The idea of general law, and our sense of its place in our federal system, 
has fallen somewhat out of fashion since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.30  
So this Article begins with an extended illustration, focused on the law of 
state borders, of why the Constitution might have left important topics to be 
regulated in this way.  It then describes how the same model illuminates the 
law of personal jurisdiction, resolving many of the confusions that followed 
Pennoyer.  Finally, the Article suggests some implications of Pennoyer’s 
view for the present day, and in particular for the powers of Congress over 
personal jurisdiction. 
Coming to a right understanding of Pennoyer tells us about much more 
than jurisdiction.  It shows that, even in the post-Erie landscape, there’s still 
a vital role for general law.  In the field of interstate relations, Erie doesn’t 
always demand deferring to state courts on the scope of their own authority.  
And if it did, so what?  In this field, as in so many, the rejection of Erie is the 
beginning of wisdom. 
I. The Model of Sovereign Borders 
A century after Pennoyer, it may seem hard to believe that the 
Constitution left personal jurisdiction open, establishing a union of states 
without limiting the reach of their courts.  Nearly eighty years after Erie, it 
may seem even stranger that the topic might have been left to general law—
 
29. See Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (2010) (offering a parade 
of pejoratives that scholars have used to describe current doctrine); Weinstein, supra note 20, at 171 
(“[T]he one point of consensus is that Supreme Court personal jurisdiction doctrine is deeply 
confused.”). 
30. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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that “fallacy,”31 that “illusion,”32 that “brooding omnipresence in the sky.”33  
Yet the Constitution did just this on a much more fundamental topic: the law 
governing state borders.  Jurisdictional rules might effectively limit state 
authority, but borders are limits on state authority; they represent the basic 
constraint on state governments that have different powers on different sides 
of the line. 
Like personal jurisdiction, the law of sovereign borders restricts state 
authority without obvious warrant in the text.  Thinking carefully about 
borders helps us see why the Constitution might fail to discuss fundamental 
features of our system; why it leaves those features as matters of general law; 
and why it regulates them, if at all, through the creation of federal institutions. 
A. Sovereign Borders and Constitutional Text 
The Constitution tells us that states have borders: they’re entities that 
“Places” can be “in,”34 “where . . . Crimes” can be “committed within,”35 
“from which” criminals can “flee,”36 and so on.37  But it doesn’t tell us where 
those borders are, or even how to find them. 
This could be a real problem for a federal union.  Like foreign nations, 
states that agree on their borders can settle them by compact, albeit with 
Congress’s consent.38  But also like foreign nations, states that disagree might 
come to blows, the way Ohio and the Michigan Territory fought the 1830s 
“Toledo War.”39  (The Constitution forbids states to “engage in War,” but not 
if they’re “actually invaded”40—such as if another state’s militia shows up on 
their land.) 
In practice, American courts use an extensive set of rules to settle border 
disputes without bloodshed.  For instance, if two states border on a river, their 
borders will shift along with slow, accretive changes in the river’s course, 
while “a sudden shoreline change known as avulsion . . . has no effect on 
boundary.”41  Usually the border doesn’t lie in the exact middle of the river, 
but “along the main downstream navigational channel, or thalweg,” which 
 
31. Id. at 79. 
32. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 
U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
33. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
34. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. 
37. See generally Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The 
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 315–20 (1992) (describing 
the constitutional commitment to territorial states). 
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
39. See generally Joseph Blocher, Selling State Borders, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 241, 264–65 (2014) 
(describing the Toledo border dispute). 
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
41. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 784 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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each state can access; and should the channel shift around an island, a 
boundary “on one side of the island remains there, even though the main 
downstream navigational channel” is now on “the island’s other side.”42 
Where do these rules come from?  Not from Congress, which hasn’t 
legislated on the topic (and maybe couldn’t).43  Nor from interstate compacts, 
nor old treaties, nor the Constitution itself—which doesn’t talk about any of 
this, and explicitly brackets the subject.44  Accretion and avulsion are 
nowhere in the text; general principles of “Our Federalism,”45 like the states 
being “coequal sovereigns,”46 won’t get us anything as specific as the 
thalweg rule.47 
Unfortunately, the one thing the Constitution does for state border 
disputes is guarantee that we’ll have to decide them.  Article III authorizes 
federal jurisdiction over controversies likely to involve state borders—such 
as those “between two or more States,” “between Citizens of different 
States,” or “between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants 
of different States.”48  But it doesn’t tell the federal courts what to do when 
such cases arise.  So the Constitution is almost maximally unhelpful: it 
ensures that federal courts will hear questions that it takes great care not to 
answer.  
B. Sovereign Borders and Modern Doctrine 
Why would the Constitution have done this?  From a modern 
perspective, it’s hard to say.  As Justices Brandeis and Holmes told us, 
“[t]here is no federal general common law,”49 no “brooding omnipresence in 
the sky.”50  So, “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or 
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State,” 
whether “declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a 
decision.”51  This produces a certain “layer-cake” picture of law, with the 
Constitution and federal law at the top, and state law (written and unwritten) 
at the bottom.  (See Figure 1.)  When the federal sources are silent, the 
 
42. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 516 U.S. 22, 25 (1995). 
43. See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1828–29 
(2012) (suggesting that it couldn’t). 
44. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“[N]othing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to 
Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”). 
45. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
46. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1245, 1325 (1996) (“Because states are coequal sovereigns under the Constitution, neither 
party to an interstate dispute has legislative power to prescribe rules of decision binding upon the 
other.” (footnote omitted)). 
47. See Sachs, supra note 43, at 1837. 
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
49. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (Brandeis, J., plurality opinion). 
50. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
51. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
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Supreme Court has told us, “state law must govern because there can be no 
other law.”52 
That picture doesn’t really work for state borders.  If the good people of 
Michigan amend their constitution to announce that they’ve always owned 
Toledo, we wouldn’t take their word for it—though nothing in the 
Constitution’s text obviously stands in their way.  (A ban on annexing new 
territory still assumes some law to determine the old territory.)  The same 
would be true if they only voted to repeal the island exception to the thalweg 
rule.  Many scholars might agree that “the Constitution implicitly strips the 
states of lawmaking power over this sort of question,”53 but it’s not clear what 
part of the Constitution is doing this—or why the Constitution is involved at 
all.  China and Japan have no constitution binding them together, but if they 
somehow submitted their territorial disputes to an American court, we’d have 
just as much reason to discount a Japanese statute as we would one from 
Michigan. 
What is more, border questions necessarily involve more than one state.  
Federal courts regard as “rules of decision” the “laws of the several states . . . 
in cases where they apply”;54 but the Rules of Decision Act doesn’t tell us 
where state laws apply, or whose laws apply where.  In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor 
Electric Manufacturing Co.,55 the Court held that Erie’s prohibition “against 
such independent determinations by the federal courts[] extends to the field 
of conflict of laws,” so that federal courts should apply the “conflict of laws 
 
52. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965) (emphasis added). 
53. Nelson, supra note 16, at 508. 
54. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 
(2012)). 
55. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
Figure 1: The Modern “Layer-Cake” View of Law 
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rules prevailing in the states in which they sit.”56  At the same time, the Court 
has given states broad license to favor their own law whenever their interests 
are at stake.57  So, in a border conflict between Michigan and Ohio, the 
modern doctrine in theory turns the interstate dispute into a race to the 
courthouse, with each federal court equally obliged to favor the state in which 
it sits.  
This is absurd, of course, which is why the Court has never taken all its 
pronouncements in Erie or Klaxon at face value.  Necessity being the mother 
of invention, the Court famously declared on the day it decided Erie that 
interstate disputes raise questions “of ‘federal common law’ upon which 
neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive.”58  The 
same now goes for other areas of law—including “the rights and obligations 
of the United States,” “international disputes,” “admiralty cases,”59 and 
perhaps questions of customary international law.60  (See Figure 2.) 
In these areas, the federal courts “have assumed the power to formulate 
and announce rules of federal law generally.”61  Like Acts of Congress, such 
rules preempt state law,62 provide federal-question jurisdiction,63 and can be 
deliberately chosen to achieve policy goals.64  That’s a neat trick, especially 
under a Constitution that vests “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . in 
a Congress of the United States.”65  It’s even more impressive given that 
modern concepts of federal common law were apparently absent for nearly a 
 
56. Id. at 494, 496. 
57. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (letting a state choose its own 
law whenever it has “a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state 
interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair” (quoting Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981))). 
58. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). 
59. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981). 
60. Compare, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as 
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 816, 821 (1997) 
[hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique] (critiquing the “modern position” that customary 
international law “has the status of federal common law”), with Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, 
Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1825–27 (1998) (defending the 
view that “international law, as applied in the United States, must be federal law”), and Curtis A. 
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 
Commentary, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260, 2260 (1998) (responding to Koh).  See generally Ernest A. 
Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365 (2002) 
(suggesting a return to earlier views of general law). 
61. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
881, 892 (1986). 
62. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988). 
63. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972); accord Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 
110. 
64. See, e.g., Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513 (adopting a test for federal-contractor liability based on 
what does and “does not seem to [the Court] sound policy”). 
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
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century after the Founding.66  (How did anyone know where the states’ 
borders were, before the Supreme Court realized it could tell them?)  So while 
the emergence of federal common law may have solved some of Erie’s 
problems, it did so only at the cost of persistent doubts.67 
C. Sovereign Borders and General Law 
There is, of course, another way to look at things—a “way of looking at 
law” that Erie and its progeny purported to “overrule[].”68  The Constitution 
may have left state borders to be governed by general law instead. 
To modern lawyers, claims about general law might sound like so much 
make-believe.  As Holmes and Brandeis saw it, a law “outside of any 
particular State,” subsisting “without some definite authority behind it,” was 
simply a “fallacy.”69  Law is only the command of a sovereign, and no one 
commanded the general law—except for the courts, which can issue new 
commands with every new ruling. 
 
66. See, e.g., Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 
1231, 1274 (1985) (“[N]othing like the theory of jurisdiction just articulated was generally accepted 
until far into the nineteenth century.”). 
67. Compare Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the 
Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761 (1989) (criticizing 
federal common law as illegitimate), with Martha A. Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common 
Law, 12 PACE L. REV. 303 (1992) (defending its legitimacy), and Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of 
(Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1 (2015) (defending its legitimacy when it most 
resembles the preexisting general law). 
68. Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945). 
69. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (Brandeis, J.) (quoting Black & White 
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532–36 (1928) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
Figure 2: The Modern View, Including Federal 
Common Law and Customary International Law 
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This “command theory” has less influence today, and for good reason.  
We routinely follow rules of English grammar and spelling that nobody ever 
laid down, rules we accept and use by practice and custom.  It’d be “merely 
dogmatic,” to borrow H.L.A. Hart’s phrase, to say that nothing can be a rule 
of grammar “unless and until it has been ordered by someone to be so.”70  
Grammar rules might vary across societies, but they’re hardly a “fallacy” or 
a “brooding omnipresence.”  In the same way, per Brian Simpson, we might 
see the common-law rules “as similar to grammarian’s rules, which both 
describe linguistic practices and attempt to systematize and order them.”71  
The customary practices—on accretion and avulsion, inheritance by half-
siblings,72 and so on—are passed on to new generations of lawyers, much the 
way grammar rules persist over time.  As Hart says, a legal system might then 
give force to these “customs of certain defined sorts,” with courts applying 
them “as they apply statute, as something which is already law and because 
it is law.”73 
In such a system, the courts’ role might be to find the law, rather than to 
make it74—to identify the recognized legal practice the way dictionary 
authors identify proper usage, or the way fashion magazines report what’s 
“in” this season.75  Courts in different jurisdictions can all draw on these 
practices and customs at the same time, just as school boards in different 
states can draw on a common linguistic tradition.  Various parts of a practice 
might be contested, and the courts’ act of describing a practice might lead 
that practice to change, the way fashion magazines sometimes set the fashion.  
But the practice itself and what any particular authority says about it are still 
two different things. 
As strange as this might seem to modern ears, it may be a better way of 
explaining legal practice at the Founding, as well as many aspects of legal 
practice today.  The place of general law was controversial from the start 
(though less so, as Stewart Jay describes, before the Alien and Sedition Acts 
made the issue politically radioactive),76 so what follows is necessarily 
summary in nature.  But without a full-blown historical account, we can still 
 
70. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 46–47 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 3d 
ed. 2012). 
71. A.W.B. SIMPSON, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL 
HISTORY 359, 376 (1987). 
72. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *70–71 (describing a rule against half-
brothers’ inheritance as “a positive law, fixed and established by custom, which custom is evidenced 
by judicial decisions; and therefore can never be departed from by any modern judge without a 
breach of his oath and the law”). 
73. HART, supra note 70, at 46. 
74. Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law (Mar. 29, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
75. I owe the fashion example to James Stern. 
76. See generally Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 
1003 (1985); Jay, supra note 66. 
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sketch out a plausible outline of the argument—and of why leaving interstate 
relations up to general law might have made a good deal of sense. 
1. General Law at the Founding.—After independence, many states 
enacted reception provisions to declare which portions of British law still 
remained in effect.77  What’s less clear is whether they had to.  The 
Revolution wasn’t a Year Zero: it severed certain links to Great Britain 
without wiping the legal slate clean.  Americans who were legally married 
on July 3, 1776, were still married the next day; so too people who owned 
houses, or owed debts, or so on.  As Chief Justice Marshall put it: 
This common law has been adopted by the legislature of Virginia.  
Had it not been adopted, I should have thought it in force.  When our 
ancestors migrated to America, they brought with them the common 
law of their native country, so far as it was applicable to their new 
situation; and I do not conceive that the Revolution would, in any 
degree, have changed the relations of man to man, or the law which 
regulated those relations.  In breaking our political connection with 
the parent state, we did not break our connection with each other.  It 
remained subsequent to the ancient rules, until those rules should be 
changed by the competent authority.78 
As Judge William Fletcher and Caleb Nelson recount, these “ancient 
rules” were seen in the early Republic as part of an existing tradition, rather 
than as a plaything of the courts.79  Standing outside any one judicial system, 
the tradition was available to multiple states at once; and two courts could 
disagree about the tradition without either being obliged to take the other’s 
view.80  In practice, judges had good reason to seek consistency, and federal 
courts often set the tone for the rest.81  They deferred to state courts on “local” 
questions about state statutes or property rules, questions that usually came 
up only in that state’s courts82—just as federal courts today will defer to the 
 
77. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXV (adopting “such parts of the common law of 
England, and of the statute law of England and Great Britain, and of the acts of the legislature of 
the colony of New York, as together did form the law” on April 19, 1775, “subject to such alterations 
and provisions as the legislature” shall make); Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of its 
Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791, 797–800 (1951) (describing the process of 
reception). 
78. Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 665 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1811) 
(No. 8411). 
79. William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1514–15 (1984); Caleb Nelson, 
A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 929–49 (2013). 
80. See Nelson, supra note 79, at 929 & n.29 (citing Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill 93 (N.Y. 1843) 
(rejecting the Supreme Court’s rule in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842))). 
81. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 79, at 1538–54 (describing the evolution of the law of marine 
insurance). 
82. See Pollard v. Dwight, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 421, 429 (1808) (Marshall, C.J.) (“In deciding on 
so much of this objection as depends on the laws of Connecticut, this court would certainly be 
guided by the construction given by that state to its own statute . . . .”); see also Swift v. Tyson, 41 
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Sixth Circuit on issues of Michigan law.83  But by and large, every court was 
to apply the general law by its own best lights.84 
The general law was also available to the United States as a whole.  
There was no “common law of America,” in the sense of a full body of 
unwritten rules that preempted contrary state law.85  Yet federal courts did 
apply general rules that were said to underlie the law of the thirteen states—
what Marshall called “those general principles and those general usages 
which are to be found not in the legislative acts of any particular state, but in 
that generally recognised and long established law, which forms the 
substratum of the laws of every state.”86  These included the systems of “Law 
and Equity,”87 together with “the practice of the courts of King’s Bench and 
Chancery in England,” which the early Supreme Court saw as “affording 
outlines for the practice of this court.”88  They included the law of nations89—
both public and private international law, including the law of admiralty,90 
the general commercial law,91 and the principles of conflict of laws.92  And 
they included innumerable other rules, great and small, which federal courts 
could apply in appropriate cases.93 
 
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) (referring to “the positive statutes of the state, and the construction 
thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, 
such as the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in their 
nature and character”). 
83. MacGregor v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 315 U.S. 280, 281 (1942) (per curiam); 
accord Rutherford v. Columbia Gas, 575 F.3d 616, 627 (6th Cir. 2009) (Clay, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
84. See Nelson, supra note 79, at 944–49 (observing that, until a consensus across jurisdictions 
emerged, state courts were likely to exercise independent judgment about the content of general 
law). 
85. See Letter from John Marshall to St. George Tucker (Nov. 27, 1800), reprinted in Jay, supra 
note 66, app. A, at 1326–27 (disparaging such an idea). 
86. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 188 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 
14,694); accord United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 159 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 
1807) (No. 14,693) (referring to England as “that country whose language is our language, and 
whose laws form the substratum of our laws”). 
87. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
88. Rule, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 411, 413–14 (1792) (emphasis omitted). 
89. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 72, at *67 (“[I]n England . . . the law of nations (wherever any 
question arises which is properly the object of [its] jurisdiction) is here adopted in [its] full extent 
by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land.”); Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, 
supra note 60, at 820, 824; Young, supra note 60, at 467. 
90. See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1–16, at 45 
(2d ed. 1975) (describing admiralty law as “probably seem[ing] ‘self-evident’” to the founders and 
as “need[ing] no express or implied legislative action on the part of any one nation to make it valid” 
in that nation’s courts); Whitten, Part One, supra note 11, at 592 & n.414; cf. Luke v. Lyde (1759) 
97 Eng. Rep. 614, 617 (K.B.) (Mansfield, C.J.) (“[T]he maritime law is not the law of a particular 
country, but the general law of nations . . . .”). 
91. See Fletcher, supra note 79, at 1517. 
92. See, e.g., Conison, supra note 3, at 1103. 
93. See, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 188, 191 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. 
Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) (applying the general law of evidence and of bail). 
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Rules like these were particularly important to a fledgling government 
with few statutes of its own.  Rather than reinvent the wheel on each topic, 
the federal system could apply existing standards whenever its own law was 
silent.94  When the Seventh Amendment incorporated “the rules of the 
common law”;95 when the All Writs Act referred to “all other writs not 
specially provided for by statute, which may be . . . agreeable to the 
principles and usages of law”;96 and when the Rules of Decision Act referred 
to state laws and “cases where they apply,”97 these weren’t empty gestures; 
people knew what they were referring to.  Indeed, the European Union did 
much the same thing after it was formed, and for much the same reasons: its 
courts now identify “general principles of EU law,” “unwritten rules of law 
which a judge of the [European Court of Justice] has to find and apply, but 
not create,” in order to “fill what would otherwise be gaps in EU law.”98 
In the early United States, general law filled the gaps in a very particular 
way.  It was available for use by federal courts without really being “federal 
law.”  It was law for the United States, but not “Law[] of the United States,”99 
of the kind that supported federal-question jurisdiction.100  And it was law of 
the land but not “supreme Law of the Land,” of the kind that would override 
contrary law in the states.101  By legislation or by local usage, a state could 
alter the general rules on any topic under its control.102  But as the Supreme 
 
94. Cf. Nelson, supra note 16, at 505 (arguing that “our federal system all but requires 
continuing recourse to rules of general law”). 
95. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
96. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1651 (2012)). 
97. Id. § 34, 1 Stat. at 92. 
98. ALINA KACZOROWSKA, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 115 (3d ed. 2013); cf. Consolidated 
Versions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 340, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. 
(C 326) 47, 193 (adopting “the general principles common to the laws of the Member States” to 
govern certain liabilities of the EU itself). 
99. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added); see 
Fletcher, supra note 79, at 1575. 
100. See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545–46 (1828) (“A case in admiralty does 
not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States. . . .  [T]he law, admiralty and 
maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied by our Courts to the cases as they arise.”); Gelston v. 
Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 325 (1818) (finding “no law of the United States, which interferes 
with, or touches, the question of damages,” as it was “a question depending altogether upon the 
common law”); cf. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286–87 (1876) (finding “no 
jurisdiction” to review a judgment involving “the law of nations” and “principles of general law 
alone”); RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW 
46 (1977) (distinguishing “‘jurisdiction of’ and ‘jurisdiction from’ the common law”). 
101. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added); see Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra 
note 60, at 823 (observing that prior to Erie, “federal court interpretations of general common law 
were not binding on the states, and a case arising under general common law did not by that fact 
alone establish federal question jurisdiction”); Fletcher, supra note 79, at 1521–27. 
102. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842); Fletcher, supra note 79, at 1532; Nelson, 
supra note 79, at 927.  But see Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, General Law in Federal 
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Figure 3: The General-Law View. (General law 
might be received by statute or by usage.) 
Court later put it, when a state couldn’t alter the prior law (or simply chose 
not to), a legal question would be “determinable only by the general 

















2. General Law and Border Disputes.—Assembling the pieces, we can 
now see how sovereign borders could rest on general law.  The Constitution 
didn’t need to say anything about sovereign borders, because the topic was 
already covered.  The text just left the general law as it stood, while creating 
new institutions to enforce it.  If a dispute arose in state court, in a case that 
couldn’t be removed, then maybe it’d be decided under state-made rules.  But 
in the cases that mattered—diversity, land grants, suits between states—there 
could be original jurisdiction in the federal courts, which would look past 
state land grabs and apply the general law for themselves. 
This is largely how the Court understood things in Rhode Island v. 
Massachusetts,104 decided in 1838.  By providing jurisdiction but not the rule 
of decision, the Constitution necessarily “gives power to decide according to 
the appropriate law of the case.”105  What counts as the appropriate law, 
absent further direction, is a question for general conflicts principles: it 
“depends on the subject matter, the source and nature of the claims of the 
parties, and the law which governs them.”106  These might include, in turn, 
 
Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 659 (2013) (noting that federal courts over time exercised 
more authority than Swift would have allowed); Clark, supra note 46, at 1290 (same). 
103. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 378 (1893); see Nelson, supra note 79, at 
927. 
104. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838). 
105. Id. at 737. 
106. Id. 
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“the law of nations,”107 “the law of prescription,”108 and—for a bill filed “on 
the equity side of the Court”—“the principles and usages of a court of 
equity.”109  In other words, general law provides both the conflicts rule and, 
potentially, the rule of decision. 
The Court also explained why it wouldn’t treat the states’ own territorial 
claims as determinative.  While the states started off with their own territories 
upon independence,110 they joined a “firm league of friendship” in the 
Articles of Confederation111—which, by “a settled principle of the law of 
nations,” would bar them from taking each other’s territory so long as the 
alliance lasted.112  When their alliance ended with ratification in 1788, each 
state “surrendered the right to judge of her own boundary” by “submitt[ing] 
the power of deciding a controversy concerning it to this Court.”113  By so 
doing, under those settled principles, each state “has parted with this 
sovereign right of judging in every case on the justice of its own pretensions, 
and has entrusted that power to a tribunal in whose impartiality it 
confides.”114  A state couldn’t assert power to declare its own sovereign 
borders and at the same time ask another sovereign’s court to declare them 
instead.  (That’s also why China or Japan, which aren’t bound by the 
Constitution, can’t declare victory by statute in someone else’s court.)  In 
other words, the general law, and not any rule imposed by the Constitution, 
told the Court which other sources of law to trust. 
The point can be put more broadly.  When a federal court hears a case, 
it needs to know what law to use and where any state laws “apply.”  That 
question can’t be settled by state laws, as we don’t know yet if they apply or 
not.  Without federal conflicts law on point, federal courts before Klaxon 
would fall back on the general law of conflicts, independently of whatever 
the state’s conflicts principles might be.  (In fact, this might have been the 
point of diversity jurisdiction, which Klaxon accidentally vitiated.)115 
 
107. Id. at 748. 
108. Id. at 749. 
109. Id. at 732. 
110. Id. at 748; accord Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 381, 398 (1852) (“It is well 
known to all of us, when the colonies dissolved their connection with the mother country by the 
Declaration of Independence, that it was understood by all of them, that each did so, with the limits 
which belonged to it as a colony.”). 
111. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III. 
112. Rhode Island, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 748. 
113. Id. 
114. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380 (1821) (cited in Rhode Island, 37 U.S. 
(12 Pet.) at 748). 
115. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 
483, 496 (1928); Laycock, supra note 37, at 282; Nelson, supra note 16, at 567; accord Ogden v. 
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 359 (1827) (Johnson, J.) (stating that the establishment of 
federal courts was intended “to obviate that conflictus legum, which has employed the pens of 
Huberus and various others, and which any one who studies the subject will plainly perceive, it is 
infinitely more easy to prevent than to adjust”). 
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So the general law helped specify the domain in which a state could 
legislate—“could,” in the sense that its legislation would be listened to.  Any 
rule a state adopted within its area of competence (torts, contracts, property, 
etc.) would be a rule of decision for the federal courts.  But if the state 
legislated outside its competence (as judged by federal conflicts statutes, or, 
in their absence, by general law), or if the state had adopted no rule of local 
law on point, the federal courts would look elsewhere.  In contrast to the 
modern layer-cake approach, a better model for these overlapping rules might 
be a stack of Swiss cheese, with different issues falling through the holes of 
one type of law to be answered by another—and sometimes slipping all the 
way through, falling outside the laws of any one state to be caught at the 
bottom by general law.  (See Figure 4.) 
As the Court later held, the right answer to these questions of general 
law will sometimes depend on who’s answering them.  Questions of 
international law aren’t federal questions, so they “must be determined in the 
first instance by the court, state or national, in which the suit is brought.”116  
In the absence of truly federal rules, a state court would take its own view of 
the general doctrine, and it might be bound to follow its own state’s statutes 
in preference thereto.117  (Even if general conflicts principles point elsewhere, 
the state legislature could always insist.)  But a federal court could take its 
own view, both of the conflicts questions and of the substance, considering 
 
116. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 683 (1892). 
117. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
Figure 4: Different Legal Questions Answered at 
Different Levels 
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each of these issues as among “those questions of general jurisprudence 
which that court must decide for itself, uncontrolled by local decisions.”118 
So it made sense for the Constitution to regulate sovereign borders by 
providing a forum instead of providing rules.  Codifying the international law 
of sovereign borders is hard; establishing some courts to apply it is easy.  If 
border questions would usually wind up in federal court, they’d be decided 
in a (presumably) neutral forum, under a (presumably) neutral view of the 
law.119  The Constitution doesn’t have to “partake of the prolixity of a legal 
code”;120 it can prevent the states from stacking the deck in their own favor 
without adopting any specific rules. 
3. General Law Today.—Surprisingly, eighty years after Erie, the Court 
still adheres to something very like these doctrines.  Though federal courts 
claim the power to create new rules, they rarely do.121  Instead, given the 
Constitution’s silence, courts tend to assume that the law of interstate 
relations is whatever it was at some prior date.  As Justice Breyer once wrote, 
“silence is not ambiguity; silence means that ordinary background law 
applies.”122 
In recent border cases, the Court has looked to the “traditional common-
law rule governing avulsive littoral changes,”123 as well as “the received rule 
of law of nations on this point, as laid down by all the writers of authority, 
including Sir William Blackstone.”124  In other words, when it comes to 
borders, federal common law isn’t all that “federal”; the Court uses the same 
rules that foreign nations do.  So do the states, applying these rules to private 
landholdings and political subdivisions.125  When the Court declares, as late 
as 1990, that the “[g]eneral rules concerning the formation of riparian land 
are well developed and are simply expressed and well accepted,”126 it’s 
invoking a “common legal object that’s part of a common legal tradition”—
not just one among hundreds of distinct bodies of law whose rules just happen 
to coincide.127 
 
118. Huntington, 146 U.S. at 683. 
119. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 60, at 826 (noting that the Constitution, 
through Article III’s heads of jurisdiction, had “enabled Congress to ensure uniform federal 
interpretations” of customary international law in the cases in which it typically arose, without 
adopting any rules in particular). 
120. M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
121. See Nelson, supra note 16, at 508 (“Instead of fashioning a brand new code of interstate 
relations, the Court has relied heavily upon preexisting bodies of general law.”). 
122. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 813 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
123. Id. at 784 (majority opinion). 
124. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
125. See, e.g., Dye v. Anderson Tully Co., 385 S.W.3d 342, 346 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011) (applying 
the thalweg rule to the boundary between two counties). 
126. Georgia v. South Carolina, 497 U.S. 376, 403 (1990). 
127. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1079, 1137 (2017). 
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As Nelson demonstrates, this persistence of general law is quite 
widespread.  It shows up in any number of fields—federal contracting, 
bankruptcy fraud, vicarious liability, criminal defenses—in which federal 
law presupposes legal rules that it doesn’t supply.128  “Rather than tracking 
the local law of any single state, . . . these federal rules reflect state law in 
general; what matters is how most states do things, not whatever the 
policymakers in one particular state have said.”129 
This participation in broadly shared practice is more than a convenient 
choice.  There’s an element here of opinio juris, a sense of legal obligation.  
The Court’s claim to make rules of federal common law doesn’t mean that it 
can “make up any rules it likes.”130  Redrawing (or “reinterpreting”) all the 
states as isosceles triangles wouldn’t just be a terrible policy choice; it’d seem 
beyond the scope of a judge’s authority, something our system hasn’t 
entrusted judges to do.  Even partisans of federal common law share an 
intuition against altering “the historic boundaries of the states”131—though 
the source of that intuition is a little unclear.  But the better understanding 
might be that the Constitution simply left certain areas of law intact, and that 
modern courts have some obligation to do the same. 
II. Personal Jurisdiction Before Pennoyer 
The Constitution treated personal jurisdiction in much the same way as 
sovereign borders.  That shouldn’t surprise us: both topics are about the range 
of state authority, over territory as well as people.  If we have rules about 
where to locate state lines, then we also might have rules about what those 
state lines mean—about what state officials can actually do, either behind 
those lines or beyond them. 
“Can,” of course, is a relative term.  Michigan “can” pass a statute 
claiming universal jurisdiction, just like it can claim ownership of Toledo.  
The question is whether anyone else will listen.132  As Shakespeare put it: 
Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep. 
Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man; But will they come when 
you do call for them?133 
 
128. Nelson, supra note 16, at 504, 524 & n.114. 
129. Id. at 503–04. 
130. Id. at 508. 
131. Field, supra note 61, at 891 n.34. 
132. See Conison, supra note 3, at 1108 (“Ultimately, whether a court ‘could’ or ‘could not’ 
legitimately exercise jurisdiction in the international sense was a matter of how other states would 
treat the resulting judgment.”). 
133. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 598 F.3d 865, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE 
FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH act 3, sc. 1). 
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This was the crucial question before Pennoyer, when personal 
jurisdiction was typically a problem in recognition.  Foreign countries’ 
judgments were obviously free of any limits in the U.S. Constitution.  The 
question for American courts was whether those judgments would be 
recognized and enforced.  A judgment with jurisdiction, one that complied 
with the international rules (or, more precisely, with the American 
understandings of those rules), was valid and could be recognized.  A 
judgment without jurisdiction was void.  The foreign court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction might be primarily regulated by its own law, but its jurisdiction 
over the parties was not.  Early American courts applied what they saw as 
rules of general and international law to determine whether foreign 
judgments deserved any respect. 
By and large, the same regime was in place for courts at home.  States 
that wanted to exercise broad jurisdiction would do so, and would execute 
judgments within their borders on as much of the defendant’s property as 
they could find.  These state judgments, unlike foreign ones, could claim the 
benefit of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the 1790 Act.  But these 
provisions were read to leave the law of personal jurisdiction alone.  So when 
American courts were presented with the judgment of another tribunal, 
whether from Michigan or Mexico, they used the same approach to 
determining personal jurisdiction.  The judgment was the product of a 
separate sovereign, which was expected to comply with international rules. 
The Constitution’s role here was largely indirect—letting defendants 
remove their cases into federal court or challenge enforcement through 
diversity suits.  But because jurisdictional standards were general law, federal 
and state courts weren’t bound by each other’s decisions, and federal courts 
could take their own view of whether the standards were satisfied.  Congress 
might have chosen to alter this regime, but it didn’t.  As a result, the same 
considerations that applied to international judgments were commonly 
applied to American judgments as well. 
A. Foreign Judgments 
In one sense, personal jurisdiction is always a matter of domestic law: 
whether a court will hear a case depends in the first instance on its own rules.  
In the widely cited 1808 case of Buchanan v. Rucker,134 a creditor brought an 
action in King’s Bench based on a judgment “of the island Court in 
Tobago.”135  Process had been served by “nailing up” the summons “at the 
Court-House door,” though the defendant “never appeared to have been 
within the limits of the island, . . . nor to have been in any other way subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Court at the time.”136  This practice was said to be 
 
134. (1808) 103 Eng. Rep. 546; 9 East. 192 (K.B.) (per curiam). 
135. Id. at 546, 9 East. at 192. 
136. Id., 9 East. at 192–93. 
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entirely lawful by Tobago’s standards; it “was warranted by a law of the 
island, and was commonly practised there.”137  Justice Johnson noted in 1827 
that “[t]he Scotch, if I remember correctly, attach the summons on the flag-
staff, or in the market place, at the shore of Leith, and the civil law process 
by proclamation, or viis et modis, is not much better.”138  Even today, French 
courts claim jurisdiction over suits by French plaintiffs against defendants 
encountered abroad.139  States might find it politic to limit their claims to 
authority, but they also might not. 
Yet these assertions of exorbitant jurisdiction do have a weakness.  If a 
French court summons you to appear, you don’t have to comply, unless you 
happen to visit or have assets in France.  If you do, international law might 
respect French authority over your person or property within their borders, 
so their initially excessive claim to jurisdiction won’t matter.  But if you don’t 
want to respond, just take a default, and make sure not to vacation in France.  
(Or, for that matter, any other country bound to respect French judgments.)140 
The real problem comes later.  In the early Republic, jurisdiction was 
frequently raised at the recognition stage, for procedural as well as 
substantive reasons.  Procedurally, before the advent of liberal pleading 
standards, it was risky for a defendant with a half-decent jurisdictional 
objection to respond to the summons.  Arguing the merits could be taken as 
consenting to the court’s authority.141  The alternative was to give up on the 
merits, by entering a special appearance or by defaulting and contesting 
enforcement elsewhere.142  Substantively, it was often better for defendants 
to litigate jurisdiction in some other forum nearer to home.  For example, in 
Buchanan, the British court refused to recognize the foreign judgment—not 
only by construing Tobago’s law more narrowly, but also by rejecting its 
 
137. Id., 9 East. at 193. 
138. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 366 (1827) (Johnson, J.). 
139. Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law of 
Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 388 & n.56 (1995) (citing 
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 14). 
140. See, e.g., Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (Recast), 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 (providing for recognition of judgments within 
the European Union). 
141. See, e.g., Pollard v. Dwight, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 421, 428–29 (1808) (Marshall, C.J.) 
(portraying defendants who argued the merits as having “placed themselves precisely in the 
situation in which they would have stood, had process been served upon them,” and so having 
“consequently waived all objections to the non-service of process”); accord Shields v. Thomas, 59 
U.S. (18 How.) 253, 259 (1855); Mayhew v. Thatcher, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 129, 130 (1821); cf. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 12(b) (“No defense or objection is waived by joining it with one or more other defenses 
or objections in a responsive pleading or in a motion.”); Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz 
Amusement Corp., 139 F.2d 871, 874 (3d Cir. 1944) (“Rule 12 has abolished for the federal courts 
the age-old distinction between general and special appearances.”). 
142. See, e.g., Orange Theatre Corp., 139 F.2d at 874. 
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international force.143  Even if Tobago’s law had made the judgment valid, 
asked Lord Ellenborough, “how could that be obligatory upon the subjects of 
other countries?  Can the island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the 
whole world?  Would the world submit to such an assumed jurisdiction?”144 
Early American courts adopted a similar approach—insisting that 
foreign courts have power over the subject matter and the parties.  This 
followed the “ubiquitous” rule in English law, inherited by the American 
legal system, that “proceedings without jurisdiction were coram non judice—
that is, not before a judge.”145  Jurisdiction was the lawful power to decide 
the case, what distinguished a real judge from Judge Judy.  Without it, “non 
est judex,” and it was no more necessary to obey the judgment than to obey 
“a mere stranger.”146  In domestic cases, a judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction was binding;147 but a judgment without jurisdiction was void, a 
“nullity” subject to collateral attack148 and which might even expose the 
officers who executed it to damages.149  A foreign judgment might be 
scrutinized on the merits;150 but a lack of jurisdiction would still turn it into 
“waste paper.”151  As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in 1808, a document 
“professing on its face to be the sentence of a judicial tribunal, if rendered by 
a self-constituted body, or by a body not empowered by its government to 
 
143. Buchanan v. Rucker (1808) 103 Eng. Rep. 546, 547; 9 East. 192, 194 (K.B.) (per curiam). 
144. Id. 
145. William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1828 (2008); see also Note, 
Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87 YALE L.J. 164, 164 
(1977) [hereinafter Filling the Void] (“For over three centuries it has been black-letter law that the 
judgment of a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action before it is null and 
void in its entirety.” (footnote omitted)). 
146. Case of the Marshalsea (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 1027, 1039; 10 Co. Rep. 68b, 76b (K.B.). 
147. Kempe’s Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 173, 186 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.) (“The 
judgment [given by the New Jersey Court of Common Pleas] was erroneous, but it is a judgment, 
and, until reversed, cannot be disregarded.”). 
148. Id. at 184–85 (determining whether the judgment was an “absolute nullit[y], which may 
be totally disregarded” in a collateral proceeding).  But see Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963) 
(restricting the use of collateral attack for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, but with little warrant 
in pre-New Deal case law). 
149. Compare Elliott v. Lessee of Peirsol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340 (1828) (noting that if a 
court should “act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities,” and “all 
persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as 
trespassers”), with Simms v. Slacum, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 300, 306–07 (1806) (reasoning that 
“judgments of a court of competent jurisdiction, although obtained by fraud, have never been 
considered as absolutely void,” so that “[a] sheriff who levies an execution under a judgment 
fraudulently obtained, is not a trespasser”). 
150. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 102 (New York, O. Halsted 
1827) (noting that a domestic court, before enforcing a foreign judgment, could “examine into the 
merits of such judgment”); Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. 
L. REV. 1201, 1214 (2009). 
151. Voorhees v. Jackson, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 449, 450, 474–75 (1836). 
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take cognizance of the subject it had decided, could have no legal effect 
whatever.”152 
To be respected abroad, foreign judgments not only needed jurisdiction 
under their own law but also had to comply with international rules.  The 
subject matters that a foreign court could hear—patent cases, say, or claims 
under $75,000—might well be left to foreign law to decide.153  But no court, 
Marshall wrote, could “exercise[] a jurisdiction which, according to the law 
of nations, its sovereign could not confer.”154  And the law of nations did 
regulate jurisdiction over the parties.  According to Marshall and Justice 
Story, whatever force a judgment might have “within the dominions of the 
prince from whom the authority is derived,”155 or “upon the subjects of that 
particular nation,”156 a judgment that exceeded international limits on 
personal jurisdiction would not be “regarded by foreign courts” as binding,157 
or given any effect “upon the rights or property of the subjects of other 
nations.”158  Principles like these didn’t come from the Constitution, or from 
anywhere else in federal law.  Instead, as James Kent put it, they were 
principles “of general jurisprudence founded on public convenience, and 
sanctioned by the usage and curtesy of nations.”159 
B. Jurisdiction in State Court 
Early American states stood in much the same position as foreign 
nations.  Upon independence they had claimed all the rights of “Free and 
Independent States,” having “full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, 
contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things 
which Independent States may of right do.”160  These powers remained in 
place unless they were limited by the Articles of Confederation,161 or later on 
 
152. Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 268–69 (1808) (Marshall, C.J.). 
153. See id. at 276 (“Of its own jurisdiction, so far as depends on municipal rules, the court of 
a foreign nation must judge, and its decision must be respected.”). 
154. Id.; see also Schooner Exchange v. M‘Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) 
(Marshall, C.J.) (“The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed by the nation as 
an independent sovereign power.”). 
155. Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 276. 
156. Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co., 3 F. Cas. 1184, 1187 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 
1839) (No. 1793). 
157. Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 276–77; accord Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812, 
814 (1870) (finding that an improperly rendered English judgment was not valid in the United 
States); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 586, at 492 (Boston, 
Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1834) (finding it “indispensable to establish, that the court pronouncing 
judgment had a lawful jurisdiction over the cause, and the parties,” or else its decision would be “a 
mere nullity, having no obligation, and entitled to no respect beyond the domestic tribunals”). 
158. Bradstreet, 3 F. Cas. at 1187. 
159. 2 KENT, supra note 150, at 102; cf. STORY, supra note 157, § 611, at 509–10 (describing 
the rules for recognition as among “the doctrines of the common law”). 
160. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis omitted). 
161. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II. 
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by the Constitution or by federal law162—none of which addressed personal 
jurisdiction.  So if a state wanted to claim exorbitant jurisdiction within its 
borders, it could; “for aught I know,” Justice Story wrote, “the local tribunals 
might give a binding efficacy to such judgments.”163  Should a state authorize 
service against a nonresident’s “tenants, attornies, or agents,” or by 
attachment of “a debt, a glove, or a chip,” federal law would not interfere; “it 
is not for us to say, that such legislation may not be rightful, and bind [that 
state’s] courts.”164  The states themselves didn’t perceive any such limits until 
the second half of the nineteenth century—at which point a few courts found 
limits in their own state constitutions, not in the federal one.165 
The ultimate constraint on state judgments was whether anyone else 
would listen to them.  A judgment would be recognized elsewhere, 
Connecticut’s high court noted in 1814, only “if the defendants [had been] so 
within the jurisdiction of the court . . . that they [could] be commanded . . . to 
appear and answer.”166  For a New Hampshire state court, a New Hampshire 
statute commanding an appearance was good enough.  But a Massachusetts 
court would first apply conflicts principles to see if that statute really bound 
the defendant—or if New Hampshire had tried, as Marshall had put it, to 
“exercise[] a jurisdiction which . . . its sovereign could not confer.”167  In 
applying those standards, states weren’t always consistent; they sometimes 
rejected judgments as illegitimate that they themselves would issue at home.  
(One Massachusetts judge in 1805 described it as “well known that many of 
the States, of which this is one, proceed to final judgment without requiring 
the appearance of the defendant, or even personal notice to him,” but he still 
voted to deny enforcement of a New Hampshire judgment for precisely that 
failing.)168 
Even before the Constitution was ratified, states were already in the 
habit of reviewing each other’s jurisdiction.  The Articles of Confederation 
provided that “[f]ull faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to 
the records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of 
 
162. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; id. amend. X. 
163. Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 612 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 
11,134); accord Dearing v. Bank of Charleston, 5 Ga. 497, 515 (1848) (acknowledging that, if 
Georgia’s legislature authorized a broader-than-usual jurisdiction, “the local tribunals might give 
effect to it”). 
164. Picquet, 19 F. Cas. at 614; accord Morrison v. Underwood, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 52, 54 
(1849) (upholding personal jurisdiction, per a Massachusetts statute, at the previous residence of a 
defendant who “was not an inhabitant of the state, and was out of the commonwealth, at the time”). 
165. See, e.g., Beard v. Beard, 21 Ind. 321, 323–24 (1863); Weil v. Lowenthal, 10 Iowa 575, 
578 (1860); see also Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 N.Y. (4 Comst.) 513, 521–22 (1851) (raising the 
possibility in dicta); Jarvis v. Barrett, 14 Wis. 591, 592 (1861) (questioning the extent of the state 
legislature’s power over jurisdiction). 
166. Hart v. Granger, 1 Conn. 153, 168–69 (1814); see Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a 
Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1573–74 (2002). 
167. Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 276 (1808) (Marshall, C.J.). 
168. Bartlet v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401, 410 (1805) (opinion of Sedgwick, J.). 
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every other State.”169  That obligation was more than a little vague; but courts 
generally agreed that, whatever it meant, it didn’t oblige them to recognize 
judgments that violated general jurisdictional rules.170  For example, a year 
after the Articles took effect, a South Carolina court required a showing of a 
“condemnation in a court of competent jurisdiction,” under “common law 
rules,” before it would recognize the judgment of a North Carolina admiralty 
court and give “due faith and credit to all its proceedings” under “[t]he act of 
confederation . . . and the law of nations.”171 
The same thing happened in Connecticut and Pennsylvania.  There, 
creditors who had won judgments by foreign attachment in Massachusetts—
seizing a handkerchief or a blanket said to belong to the defendant—tried to 
get their judgments recognized abroad.172  The courts in both states refused, 
with Chief Justice McKean of Pennsylvania dryly congratulating the plaintiff 
on obtaining the blanket; “[i]f that is sufficient to satisfy [him], he has done 
well to secure himself.”173  But the judgment itself could only be considered 
as “a proceeding in rem, and ought not certainly to be extended further than 
the property attached.”174  The Articles didn’t speak expressly to the issue of 
jurisdiction, and they “must not be construed to work such evident mischief 
and injustice, as are contained in the doctrine, urged for the Plaintiff.”175  
Likewise, the Connecticut court rejected the argument that the “pretended 
service of the writ”176 at the defendant’s home in Connecticut, together with 
the attachment of a handkerchief in Massachusetts, might suffice for 
jurisdiction under Massachusetts law.177  Those acts couldn’t give a 
Massachusetts court “legal jurisdiction of the cause”; the Articles only 
mandated respect for judgments “where both parties are within the 
jurisdiction of such courts at the time of commencing the suit, and are duly 
served with the process, and have or might have had a fair trial of the 
cause.”178 
Courts continued to reason this way after ratification.  Judges today 
speak of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in almost mystical tones, as 
 
169. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 3. 
170. See Sachs, supra note 150, at 1221–26 (describing areas of confusion and of agreement, 
both before and after the Articles). 
171. Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 8, 10 (1784) (per curiam). 
172. See generally Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786); Phelps v. Holker, 1 
U.S. (1 Dall.) 261 (Pa. 1788). 
173. Phelps, 1 U.S. at 264 (opinion of McKean, C.J.). 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Kibbe, 1 Kirby at 126. 
177. Id. at 120–21, 125–26; accord Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37, 38, 40–41 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1809) (per curiam) (rejecting the argument that the Massachusetts judgment should be 
recognized because “by the laws of Massachusetts, . . . the judgment was regular and valid, and 
would be so considered in Massachusetts”). 
178. Kibbe, 1 Kirby at 126. 
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“alter[ing] the status of the several states” and “mak[ing] them integral parts 
of a single nation.”179  But the Clause actually left the states as foreign to one 
another in important ways.  The Constitution’s Clause largely resembled that 
of the Articles; it included “public Acts” along with “Records, and judicial 
Proceedings,” and it let Congress “prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, 
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”180  
Congress soon followed up with the 1790 Act, which specified the mode of 
authentication and added that “the said records and judicial proceedings” 
would have “such faith and credit given to them in every court within the 
United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from 
whence the said records are or shall be taken.”181  Yet none of these changes 
were thought to displace the existing jurisdictional rules. 
That became apparent in the course of a long debate in state courts over 
the 1790 Act.  The Act left unclear whether the phrase “such faith or credit” 
addressed effect or authentication—whether it made sister-state judgments 
conclusive on the merits, or whether it made particular copies of the 
judgments, once introduced in court, conclusive evidence of the originals’ 
existence and contents.  As I’ve described elsewhere,182 courts and 
commentators argued about this for decades, both before and after the 
Supreme Court endorsed the “effect” interpretation in Mills v. Duryee.183 
Mills probably got it wrong,184 but for now it doesn’t matter.  What does 
matter is something on which both sides of the debate agreed: that a state 
judgment could be challenged in other courts for violating general-law rules 
of personal jurisdiction.  In a widely cited 1803 decision in New York, some 
justices opposed the “effect” reading precisely because it might give effect to 
whatever strange forms of jurisdiction states might exercise at home.185  
Supporters of the “effect” reading countered that the 1790 Act implicitly 
applied only to valid judgments that respected the prevailing rules.186 
The courts spoke rather vaguely about the exact source of these rules.  
What counsel in one 1809 case in New York called “the principles, of the 
 
179. V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1020 (2016) (quoting Milwaukee Cty. v. M.E. White Co., 
296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935)). 
180. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
181. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012)). 
182. Sachs, supra note 150, at 1233–78. 
183. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 484 (1813). 
184. See Sachs, supra note 150, at 1233–40 (collecting evidence on the meaning of the 1790 
Act); id. at 1259–62 (describing the Mills decision). 
185. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Aicken, 1 Cai. 460, 481 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803) (opinion of Kent, J.); 
id. at 478 (opinion of Radcliff, J.); accord Picket v. Johns, 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 123, 131 (1827) 
(opinion of Henderson, J.). 
186. See, e.g., Hitchcock, 1 Cai. at 465–66 (opinion of Thompson, J.); id. at 473 (opinion of 
Livingston, J.); accord Rogers v. Coleman, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 413, 417 (1808); Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 
(9 Tyng) 462, 469 (1813) (Parsons, C.J.) (per curiam); Picket, 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) at 134 (Taylor, 
C.J., dissenting); Curtis v. Martin, 2 N.J.L. (1 Penning.) 399, 406 (1805) (Pennington, J.). 
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common law,”187 the court referred to as “the first principles of justice,”188 
while a Kentucky court combined international-law rhetoric,189 general-law 
reasoning,190 and a concern that a contrary view would be “too rigid and 
unjust.”191 
Yet one particularly influential explanation, advanced in the 1813 
Massachusetts case of Bissell v. Briggs,192 was simply that the restrictions 
had existed in international law before the Constitution and that the 1790 Act 
had left them in place.  Before the Articles of Confederation, “all the courts 
of the several provinces, colonies or states were, at common law, deemed to 
be foreign to each other, and judgments rendered by any one of them were 
considered by the others as foreign judgments.”193  The Constitution and 1790 
Act had altered the recognition process in various ways, but neither had the 
“intention of enlarging, restraining, or in any manner operating upon, the 
jurisdiction . . . of the courts of any of the United States,” which “remains as 
it was before.”194  To receive any benefit from the “federal constitution,” 
then, “the court must have had jurisdiction, not only of the cause, but of the 
parties”195—under rules that the Constitution didn’t supply.  Should a state 
court “render judgment against a man not within the state, nor bound by its 
laws, nor amenable to the jurisdiction of its courts,” its jurisdiction “might be 
inquired into” in another tribunal, “and if a want of jurisdiction appeared, no 
credit would be given to the judgment.”196 
These views continued to dominate in state courts, and the Supreme 
Court took care to leave the jurisdictional issue open when it opted for the 
“effect” interpretation in Mills.197  The Court reaffirmed Mills in Hampton v. 
M‘Connel,198 and the jurisdictional issue was understood to stay open 
 
187. Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37, 40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (argument of counsel). 
188. Id. at 41 (majority opinion) (per curiam). 
189. Rogers, 3 Ky. (Hard.) at 419. 
190. See id. at 417 (“Jurisdiction of the courts, is spoken of, and a proper attention to that 
subject, will furnish an easy solution . . . .”). 
191. Id. 
192. 9 Mass. (9 Tyng) 462 (1813) (per curiam). 
193. Id. at 464–65 (Parsons, C.J.). 
194. Id. at 467. 
195. Id. at 468. 
196. Id. 
197. See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 484 (1813) (noting pointedly that “the 
Defendant had full notice of the suit, for he was arrested and gave bail”); see also id. at 486–87 
(Johnson, J., dissenting) (worrying that details of common-law pleading might lead to the 
enforcement of out-of-state judgments contrary to “eternal principles of justice which never ought 
to be dispensed with”). 
198. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235 (1818) (Marshall, C.J.). 
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afterwards,199 despite some indications to the contrary.200  By 1828, according 
to the highest court of Massachusetts, “almost every State court in the Union” 
had ruled on the subject, and their views were “unanimous” that “in all 
instances, the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment may be 
inquired into.”201  The “principles of the common law” applicable “to 
judgments of the tribunals of foreign countries” were still just as applicable 
“to the judgments of the courts of the several States when sought to be 
enforced [abroad].”202  Positions like these were repeatedly expressed by state 
courts.203 
C. Jurisdiction in Federal Court 
This account of state courts is largely consistent with the scholarly 
consensus.  What’s less well known is the role of federal courts in this 
system—and that they, too, held the judgments of state courts at arm’s length. 
In the early Republic, relatively few interesting personal jurisdiction 
questions arose in cases filed originally in federal court.  Under the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, no one could be “arrested in one district for trial in another, in 
any civil action before a circuit or district court,” and a suit against a U.S. 
resident had to be heard in the district “whereof he is an inhabitant, or in 
which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ.”204  In any suit that 
satisfied the statute, personal jurisdiction was already airtight. 
 
199. Id. at 236 n.c (1818) (reporter’s footnote) (“[I]t may safely be affirmed, that the question 
is still open in this court whether . . . a plea to the jurisdiction of the court in which the judgment 
was obtained . . . might, in some cases, be pleaded . . . to avoid the judgment.”); Gerault v. 
Anderson, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 30, 33 (1818) (noting contemporary agreement “that the jurisdiction 
of [another state’s] courts can be enquired into, in an action brought on a judgment”); see also 
Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380, 386 (1822) (holding that only judgments “as are duly rendered by 
a court of competent jurisdiction” need to be afforded full faith and credit); Borden v. Fitch, 15 
Johns. 121, 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818) (holding that a judgment rendered by another state is only 
“conclusive where the defendant was arrested, or had in some way appeared, and had an opportunity 
of defending the original suit”). 
200. See Lanning v. Shute, 5 N.J.L. 778, 779–80 (1820) (“The question presented by these 
pleadings [attacking a New York judgment] has been considered and settled . . . in the Supreme 
Court of the United States, in the case of Hampton v. M‘Connel.  This last is conclusive . . . ; we 
have no further discretion upon it.”). 
201. Hall v. Williams, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 232, 244 (1828). 
202. Id. at 238. 
203. See, e.g., Dearing v. Bank of Charleston, 5 Ga. 497, 513 (1848) (“[T]he Constitution leaves 
this question where we find it—it is still a question of jurisdiction and State authority.”); Starbuck 
v. Murray, 5 Wend. 148, 158 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830) (holding, as to jurisdiction, that “the judgment 
of a court of another state is in its effect like a foreign judgment”); Steel v. Smith, 7 Watts & Serg. 
447, 451 (Pa. 1844) (“Such is the familiar, reasonable and just principle of the law of nations; and 
it is scarce supposable that the framers of the constitution designed to abrogate it between States 
which were to remain as independent of each other, for all but national purposes, as they were before 
the revolution.”); see also Sallee v. Hays, 3 Mo. 116, 117–18 (1832) (reading Mills to permit a 
Missouri court to set aside a Kentucky judgment on jurisdictional grounds). 
204. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79. 
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But federal courts did hear actions involving the recognition of other 
courts’ judgments, giving them opportunities to comment on the general 
rules.  Federal courts, like state courts, reviewed the judgments of other 
judicial systems much like those of foreign nations.205  As in the maritime 
insurance cases studied by Judge Fletcher, federal and state courts saw 
themselves as engaged in the same enterprise, with the U.S. Supreme Court 
as “primus inter pares” in determining questions of general law.206  The 1790 
Act, which applied to “every court within the United States,”207 made it 
particularly urgent for federal courts to decide which judgments to enforce, 
but it left the law of jurisdiction as it stood.  And by directing new cases into 
federal courts, the statute created new opportunities to assess the states’ 
compliance with the general law. 
 1. General Principles.—The federal courts’ approach flowed naturally 
from the ordinary procedure on collateral attack.  Consider Elliott v. Lessee 
of Peirsol,208 which arose from a challenge in a federal court in Kentucky to 
a prior Kentucky judgment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision in 1828, noting that “the 
jurisdiction of any Court exercising authority over a subject, may be inquired 
into in every Court, when the proceedings of the former are relied on.”209  
With jurisdiction, the state court’s judgment would normally be binding and 
conclusive; without jurisdiction, “its judgments and orders are regarded as 
nullities.”210  Even though the Kentucky state and federal courts were as 
closely related as courts from different systems could be, the Court saw no 
reason why the state courts’ jurisdiction would be immune from scrutiny: 
“We know nothing in the organization of the Circuit Courts of the Union, 
which can contradistinguish them from other Courts, in this respect.”211 
A few years earlier, in Flower v. Parker,212 Justice Story had taken the 
same approach as to personal jurisdiction.  A Massachusetts court gave 
judgment against a Louisiana resident after “trustee process” on locals who 
owed him money;213 when the Louisianan later tried to recover from the 
locals in a Massachusetts federal court, the locals pled the state-court 
judgment in defense.214  On circuit, Story noted that Massachusetts might 
have had in rem jurisdiction over the debts themselves (as in the later, more 
 
205. For extended discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 319–46. 
206. Fletcher, supra note 79, at 1575. 
207. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. 
208. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328 (1828). 
209. Id. at 340–41 (emphasis added). 
210. Id. at 340. 
211. Id. 
212. 9 F. Cas. 323 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1823) (No. 4891). 
213. Id. at 323–24. 
214. Id. 
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famous case of Harris v. Balk),215 but the original creditor had bungled the 
state procedures.216  More importantly, though the initial action had listed the 
Louisianan as a defendant, Story found that the judgment didn’t actually bind 
him—based on the “universal” principle, “consonant with the general 
principles of justice, that the legislature of a state can bind no more than the 
persons and property within its territorial jurisdiction.”217  Indeed, Story 
wrote, “[n]o legislature can compel any persons, beyond its own territory, to 
become parties to any suits instituted in its domestic tribunals.”218  In other 
words, the federal circuit court reviewed a judgment from Massachusetts 
under the same general principles as one from anywhere else. 
2. Full Faith and Credit.—Nothing in the Constitution or the 1790 Act 
required the courts to do otherwise.  While some federal decisions on the 
“effect” controversy simply skipped over the jurisdictional issues,219 one 
early case did not.  In 1799, Justice Washington on circuit refused to treat a 
Maryland bankruptcy discharge as discharging the defendant’s debt to a 
Virginia creditor.220  As the plaintiff hadn’t been summoned to attend the 
proceeding, the discharge couldn’t really “be considered as a judgment of a 
Maryland court, which can bind persons residing out of that state.”221  
Washington specifically compared the issue to that of recognition of a foreign 
judgment, noting that while admiralty decisions received a certain preference 
under the law of nations, “the justice of other decisions may be questioned, 
and if a law of a foreign country were to declare that a decision of causes, 
without notice, should bind everybody, no foreign country would observe 
it.”222  The Full Faith and Credit Clause might have been read to require 
obedience to such a judgment, but it gave the duty of prescribing effect to 
Congress, and according to Justice Washington, nothing that Congress had 
written gave any effect to the discharge at issue.223 
 
215. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). 
216. See Flower, 9 F. Cas. at 325–26. 
217. Id. at 324–25. 
218. Id. at 324. 
219. See, e.g., Bastable v. Wilson, 2 F. Cas. 1012, 1012 (C.C.D.C. 1803) (No. 1097) (per 
curiam) (refusing a plea of nil debet to an action of debt on a state judgment); Armstrong v. Carson, 
1 F. Cas. 1140, 1140 (Wilson, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1794) (No. 543) (same). 
220. Banks v. Greenleaf, 2 F. Cas. 756, 756, 758–59 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 
1799) (No. 959). 
221. Id. at 758. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 759.  But see Green v. Sarmiento, 10 F. Cas. 1117, 1119–20 (Washington, Circuit 
Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1810) (No. 5760) (suggesting in dicta ten years later that the validity of a New 
York state judgment under the 1790 Act would turn only on New York law, without recognizing 
any tension with Banks, and noting only that cases where a judgment rendered “exparte,” with “the 
defendant having had no opportunity to make his defense . . . might form an exception”); Field v. 
Gibbs, 9 F. Cas. 15, 16 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.N.J. 1815) (No. 4766) (“[W]hat . . . is 
to be done, if the judgment has been obtained against a person, residing out of the state, who was 
never served with process, or even notified of the existence of the suit, in which it was rendered?  I 
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After leaving the matter open for some decades, the Supreme Court 
appeared to endorse this view in 1839, when it noted in M‘Elmoyle v. 
Cohen224 that federal courts presented with prior state-court judgments could 
“inquire” into “the right of the state itself to exercise authority over the 
persons or the subject matter.”225  Echoing the reasoning of Bissell (and of 
Justice Story’s then-recent treatise on the Constitution), the Court wrote that 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause “did not mean to confer a new power of 
jurisdiction, but simply to regulate the effect of the acknowledged 
jurisdiction over persons and things within the state.”226 
In 1851, the Court settled the issue in D’Arcy v. Ketchum,227 holding that 
neither the Clause nor the 1790 Act gave effect to judgments that lacked 
jurisdiction under international law.  D’Arcy involved a New York judgment 
against several copartners based on the appearance of one of them, a 
procedure accepted in New York but not universally.228  The creditor tried to 
enforce the judgment in a federal court in Louisiana229—facing that court 
with “the question, whether the New York statute, and the judgment founded 
on it, bound a citizen of Louisiana not served with process.”230  On writ of 
error, the Court analyzed the question in terms familiar since Bissell: under 
“well-established rules of international law, regulating governments foreign 
to each other,” courts would “disregard a judgment merely against the person, 
where he has not been served with process nor had a day in court.”231  Such 
a proceeding “is deemed an illegitimate assumption of power, and resisted as 
mere abuse.”232  That was “the international law as it existed among the States 
in 1790,”233 and neither the Constitution nor the 1790 Act had “altered the 
rule”;234 Congress legislated “[s]ubject to this established principle,” and 
without any intent “to overthrow [it].”235  Even if New York’s statutory 
service provisions were valid in New York’s courts, they had no power to 
“bind the citizens of one State to the laws of another.”236  New York could 
say that its judgments were valid, but under ordinary conflicts principles, no 
 
answer, that his remedy is the same, and no other, as would be open to him, if the suit had been 
brought in the state, where the judgment was rendered.” (footnote omitted)). 
224. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839). 
225. Id. at 326–27. 
226. Id. at 327 (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 1307, at 183 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833)). 
227. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1851). 
228. Id. at 166–67, 174. 
229. Id. at 167. 
230. Id. at 174. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 176. 
234. Id. at 174. 
235. Id. at 176. 
236. Id. 
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one else had to listen.  New York’s statutes simply couldn’t settle the question 
when “neither the legislative jurisdiction [of New York], nor that of [its] 
courts of justice, had binding force.”237 
3. Federal-Question Review.—D’Arcy was purely a negative decision: 
it confirmed that courts were under no obligation to recognize a judgment 
that lacked international sanction.  But it quickly gave rise to more 
affirmative holdings, as the federal courts were now clearly committed to 
international rules of jurisdiction.  So when one state court denied recognition 
to the valid judgment of another—valid, that is, according to the federal view 
of things—the losing party could seek Supreme Court review under section 
25 of the Judiciary Act, portraying the denial as contrary to a “title, right, 
privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed” under the 1790 Act.238 
In this way, the 1790 Act served as an occasional “hook” for the Court 
to correct state-court errors on the general law of jurisdiction.  In 1867, the 
Court held that it had federal-question jurisdiction to review a New York 
decision refusing to give effect to an Illinois judgment.239  Two New Yorkers 
claimed certain movable property located in Chicago; the property was 
attached and awarded to one of them in Illinois, but a New York court later 
denied Illinois’s in rem jurisdiction, in light of an outstanding mortgage under 
New York law.240  The two states’ substantive laws disagreed on whether the 
property had been liable to attachment, and the Supreme Court applied what 
it saw as the general conflicts rule—namely that the state where the property 
was located had had full power to attach and dispose of it.241 
This rule didn’t come from any federal statute, of course, and questions 
of general law couldn’t support federal jurisdiction on their own.242  If the 
issue were merely one of New York law, or even of general conflicts or 
property law that New York had adopted as its own, then the Court would 
have had no grounds for federal-question review of the New York 
judgment243—any more than it could review ordinary errors in state property 
 
237. Id. 
238. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738 (2012)); accord Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130, 134 (1875) (“[W]hether 
the validity or due effect of a judgment of the State court, or that of a judgment of a United States 
court, is disallowed by a State court, the Constitution and laws furnish redress by a final appeal to 
this court.”); see also Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290, 301–03 (1866) (holding that the 
1790 Act rendered a Mississippi statute “unconstitutional and void as affecting the right of the 
plaintiff to enforce” a valid Kentucky judgment). 
239. Green v. Van Buskirk, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 307, 314 (1867). 
240. Id. at 311, 313. 
241. Green v. Van Buskirk, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 139, 148–52 (1869). 
242. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 287 (1875). 
243. See Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 325 (1818) (Story, J.) (refusing to examine 
a state court’s award of damages because it was “a question depending altogether upon the common 
law,” and not on a “law of the United States”). 
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or contract cases as unconstitutional takings or impairments of contracts.244  
The Court wouldn’t invent federal issues by assuming that state courts had 
gotten their own law wrong.245 
Today we might explain the Court’s involvement by reference to 
modern concepts of federal common law.246  James Weinstein, for example, 
has argued specifically in these terms, contending that the 1790 Act implicitly 
authorized a federal common law that was “essentially homegrown” rather 
than “mindlessly adopted” from international standards.247  As Weinstein 
correctly notes, early courts often described the rules they applied as being 
good policy248—much as courts often do today.  But it’s hardly clear that 
these courts actually viewed their rules as purely “instrumental”249—or that 
their routine claims to be applying international standards,250 or at least 
attempting to apply them, were made in bad faith.  Rather than reading the 
Act as implicitly authorizing something new, the simpler explanation—and 
the one more faithful to the sources’ own self-understanding—may just be 
that the Act failed to override something old. 
Instead, what made the 1790 Act special was that it rested a federal issue 
(such as whether an Illinois judgment had to be recognized by other courts) 
on a state judgment’s international validity and, in turn, on the reach of the 
state court’s jurisdiction under the preexisting international law.251  This was 
a question of general law, and one which New York’s laws couldn’t 
override—at least not in a way that the courts of other sovereigns had to 
 
244. See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. Rock, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 177, 181 (1866) (rejecting an argument that 
“every case of a contract held by the State court not to be binding, for any cause whatever, can be 
brought to this court for review”). 
245. See Miller v. Nicholls, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 311, 315 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (“No other 
question is presented, than the correctness of the decision of the State Court, according to the laws 
of Pennsylvania, and that is a question over which this Court can take no jurisdiction.”); see also 
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 638 (1875) (declining to review the portion 
of a Tennessee judgment based on “general principles of equity jurisprudence” and “unaffected by 
anything found in the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”); Rector v. Ashley, 73 
U.S. (6 Wall.) 142, 147 (1867) (refusing to undertake the “useless labor” of reviewing a judgment 
sustainable on state-law grounds). 
246. Cf. Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Four Functions: Reframing Choice of Law in Federal Courts, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 626 (2013) (arguing that, “[a]fter Erie,” federal courts are limited in 
their ability to apply general law directly, but “may create federal common law that incorporates or 
chooses general law”). 
247. Weinstein, supra note 20, at 193, 195. 
248. See id. at 195–98 (providing examples of “early nineteenth-century judges,” both state and 
federal, who “candidly acknowledged the instrumental reasons” for limits on jurisdiction). 
249. Id. at 195. 
250. E.g., Bryant v. Ela, 1 Smith 396, 401 (N.H. 1815) (“The law of nations forms a part of the 
law of Vermont, and of this State, and of every independent State.”). 
251. See Green v. Van Buskirk, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 139, 148–51 (1869); see also Crapo v. Kelly, 
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 610, 618–22 (1872) (exercising federal-question jurisdiction to decide, based on 
general conflicts principles, that a Massachusetts judgment was valid and so required recognition in 
New York); Whitten, Part One, supra note 11, at 587–89 (summarizing the effect of Green and 
Crapo). 
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respect.  New York could say that an Illinois judgment was invalid, but that 
wouldn’t make it so. 
This interdependence of federal and general law was what separated the 
general law of jurisdiction from, say, the law of negotiable instruments 
applied in Swift v. Tyson252—or from any other field of general law from 
which the states could depart by legislation.253  To the extent that a federal 
question rested directly on the general law of jurisdiction, a federal court had 
to take its own view of the issue,254 rather than treating it as a question of 
state law on which a state court—or even a state statute—might have the last 
word.255  As one law review put it, “the question of jurisdiction being thus 
thrown open to inquiry, the courts are at liberty to govern their conduct upon 
the subject, by the principles of international law.”256  
D. Departures from General Law 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, together with the 1790 Act, partly 
federalized the general law of personal jurisdiction.  But they did so in a very 
particular way.  Despite what some scholars have argued, D’Arcy didn’t hold 
that the Act or Clause simply adopted the then-prevailing standards of 
jurisdiction, as if in invisible ink.257  Neither did they authorize new fields of 
federal common lawmaking.  Instead, they merely obliged states to respect 
valid sister-state judgments, full stop.  But when the question of validity came 
before a federal court, whether in its original jurisdiction or on Supreme 
Court review, that court would have to determine the question according to 
its own views of general law.258  As later courts recognized, D’Arcy simply 
applied a rule of international law, which it held that federal law had left 
alone.259  This left substantial flexibility, both for states and for Congress, to 
depart from the general standards. 
 
252. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
253. See id. at 18 (noting that “the Courts of New York do not found their decisions upon this 
point upon any local statute,” and suggesting that a federal court would be obliged to enforce that 
statute if they did). 
254. Cf. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 683–84 (1892) (holding that if a state refuses to 
recognize what it sees as a penal judgment, the Court “must determine for itself whether the original 
cause of action is penal in the international sense”). 
255. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
256. Alexander Martin, Actions Against Non-residents and Absentees, 15 AM. L. REG. 1, 9 
(1866). 
257. See, e.g., Rheinstein, supra note 25, at 795–96 (taking the Clause, as construed by D’Arcy, 
to apply “to the judicial proceedings of such other State as under the Law of Nations has had 
jurisdiction to proceed judicially”).  But see David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 
118 YALE L.J. 1584, 1589 (2009) (noting that the Clause itself—as opposed to the 1790 Act—
wasn’t understood to stipulate the effect of state acts or judgments until the decision in Chicago & 
Alton R.R. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615 (1887)). 
258. See supra subpart II(C). 
259. See, e.g., Hall v. Lanning, 91 U.S. 160, 168–69 (1875) (describing D’Arcy as reading the 
1790 Act to “prescribe only the effect of judgments” of courts that “had jurisdiction,” including “by 
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As general law, the rules of personal jurisdiction could be overridden by 
state law within a state’s own courts.  If a state wanted its courts to recognize 
the exorbitant decisions of some other tribunal (domestic or foreign), that was 
just fine.  General law could be overridden by statute, and neither the Clause 
nor the Act forbade states to act against interest.260  Or if a state simply 
misunderstood the international rules, accepting more sister-state judgments 
as valid than it had to, that was fine, too.261  And if a state wanted to ignore 
D’Arcy and serve process on copartners anyway, within its own courts, that 
was also fine.  So long as it understood that other courts might not enforce 
its judgments, it would never have to worry about federal review.  As one 
mid-nineteenth-century commentator wrote, “[i]t could hardly be shown that 
such a law was in violation of the Federal Constitution, and the courts would 
not be justified in declaring it void as opposed to natural justice or the 
principles of international law.”262  The only rule binding the states was that, 
if a state or federal judgment did have jurisdiction, under its own law and 
under the international rules, it had to be given effect under the 1790 Act.  If 
a state court failed in this, its decision could be taken up to the Supreme 
Court263—in which case the federal courts’ view of the general law was the 
one that counted. 
Yet general law could be overridden in federal courts too.  Because the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause didn’t really constitutionalize jurisdiction, it left 
it open for Congress—in the exercise of some enumerated power—to rewrite 
the rules.  International standards of jurisdiction could be used to supplement 
and interpret federal statutes, as other international rules are today.264  But 
they could also be abrogated, both for federal and for state courts. 
Congress’s power was prominently examined in the 1828 case of 
Picquet v. Swan,265 in which Justice Story on circuit used the general law to 
 
international law”); Price v. Hickok, 39 Vt. 292, 298, 301 (1866) (describing D’Arcy—under the 
wrong name but the correct page citation—as resting “upon general principles of international law 
existing between the several states of the Union”). 
260. See Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. (9 Tyng) 462, 466 (1813) (describing a 1795 Massachusetts 
statute that recognized judgments rendered in other states and adding that “we know of no provision 
in the federal constitution, or in any law of Congress passed in pursuance of it, prohibiting any state 
from giving to judgments recovered in any other state any effect it may think proper” so long as the 
state “does not derogate from the effect secured by the constitution, and the acts of congress passed 
under it”). 
261. Cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 
1585–86 (1990) (noting that before 1914, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to review state 
decisions mistakenly upholding claims of federal right). 
262. Martin, supra note 256, at 12. 
263. See supra note 238 (discussing Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130 (1875)). 
264. See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (stating 
the canon that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any 
other possible construction remains”); see also F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 
U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (invoking this canon). 
265. 19 F. Cas. 609 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134). 
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resolve a potential conflict between two acts of Congress.  The Process Act 
of 1792 told federal courts to use certain state modes of proceeding266—
which included, in Picquet, a version of foreign attachment.267  Yet by the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, as noted above, a suit against a U.S. resident could 
only be brought in the district “whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he 
shall be found at the time of serving the writ.”268  Story reconciled the two by 
holding that plaintiffs could “use the appropriate state process” to reach 
defendants who already met the Judiciary Act’s terms—but that state laws 
could “confer no authority on this court to extend its jurisdiction over persons 
or property, whom it could not otherwise reach.”269 
The Supreme Court endorsed the same solution a decade later,270 but 
what’s more important is Story’s reasoning.  The reach of any court, whether 
state or federal, was presumed to be limited by “the general principles of law 
[that] must be presumed to apply to them all”—namely, that a court of a 
particular territory “is bounded in the exercise of its power by the limits of 
such territory.”271  Because the Judiciary Act had created territorial districts, 
the territorial scope of a lower court’s powers would be determined by 
applying the ordinary rules of international law.272 
Yet if the jurisdictional rules only had the status of general law, they 
could be overridden by statute.  If Congress wanted to, it could tell the federal 
courts to send their process “into every state in the Union”273—a conclusion 
that the Supreme Court would later reach as well.274  Indeed, Story wrote, if 
Congress ordered that “a subject of England, or France, or Russia, . . . be 
summoned from the other end of the globe,”275 a federal court “would 
certainly be bound to follow it, and proceed upon the law.”276  Story 
expressed no sense of any constitutional limit on this power, in the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause or anywhere else.  All that mattered was 
whether the court had jurisdiction—and the only limits on its jurisdiction 
were those of general law, which federal statutes would always outrank.  
Such an exorbitant jurisdiction would, of course, “be deemed an usurpation 
of foreign sovereignty, not justified or acknowledged by the law of 
 
266. See generally Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275. 
267. 19 F. Cas. at 609–10. 
268. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79. 
269. Picquet, 19 F. Cas. at 611. 
270. See Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838) (concurring with Picquet’s 
substance and describing its reasoning “as having great force”). 
271. Picquet, 19 F. Cas. at 611. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. 
274. Toland, 37 U.S. at 328. 
275. Picquet, 19 F. Cas. at 613. 
276. Id. at 615. 
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nations”;277 so Story wouldn’t lightly “infer[]” so extraordinary a rule “from 
so general a legislation as congress has adopted.”278  But Story offered no 
reason to suppose that, if Congress did want to assert universal jurisdiction, 
there was anything in the Constitution to stop it. 
Congress’s ability to revise the law of jurisdiction may also have 
extended into the state courts.  Under the second sentence of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, Congress had power “by general Laws” to “prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and 
the Effect thereof.”279  In a series of proposals in the early nineteenth century, 
congressional drafters repeatedly made the effect of a judgment in other 
states turn on the source of personal jurisdiction.280  One typical bill proposed 
in 1806 would have made state judgments conclusive “against any party 
thereto, who appeared, or was personally served with legal notice to 
appear”—but rebuttable on the merits if the defendant “neither appeared, nor 
was personally served with legal notice.”281 
If the Constitution itself had required personal service, or even just 
adherence to the international rules, these bills would have been 
unconstitutional: a judgment without jurisdiction was void, not merely 
rebuttable.  But if the jurisdictional rules were general law, they could be 
abrogated by a properly enacted statute.  Congress could use its power to 
“prescribe . . . the Effect”282 of state judgments by determining which ones 
would be recognized in federal courts, whether or not they would be 
respected abroad.  As it happens, none of these bills were ever enacted.  But 
the fact that they were proposed, and that the objections to them typically 
weren’t phrased in constitutional terms, suggests that there was no firm 
consensus against their constitutionality—and that if Congress had tried to 
exercise its power, it might well have succeeded.283 
III. What Pennoyer Got Right 
At the Founding, personal jurisdiction was a topic in general law, 
focused on a state’s sovereign power over persons or property within its 
territory.  Today, it’s a constitutional question rooted in due process.  How 
 
277. Id. at 611. 
278. Id. at 615. 
279. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
280. See Sachs, supra note 150, at 1254–57, 1262–66, 1267–74 (describing these proposals). 
281. H.R. 46, 9th Cong., § 1 (1st Sess. 1806).  For other proposals, see H.R. 17, 15th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 1817); H.R. 45, 13th Cong. (2d Sess. 1814); H.R. 20, 10th Cong. (2d Sess. 1808). 
282. U.S. Cᴏɴsᴛ. art. IV, § 1. 
283. See Sachs, supra note 150, at 1270–74 (describing the debates over the 1817 proposal); 
see also id. at 1264–65 n.278 (“[T]he cases and bills discussed here show judgments rendered 
without personal service were thought to be potentially enforceable. . . .  [T]here is no indication in 
the debates that such enforcement by a federal court would have violated due process.”). 
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did we get from there to here?  And how could Pennoyer have lawfully 
brought about this change? 
As it turns out, Pennoyer was a sensible, perhaps even natural 
consequence of combining existing jurisdictional doctrines with the newly 
enacted Fourteenth Amendment.  Pennoyer’s application of traditional 
principles was more or less right, in both reasoning and result.  More 
importantly, Pennoyer was right as to its most “novel,” even “startling,” 
contribution to American law: the identification of due process as a limit on 
state jurisdiction.284  On that question, Pennoyer’s approach was and is 
entirely defensible. 
The starting point for Pennoyer’s holding was that state and federal 
courts could take different views of the general law.  As other scholars have 
concluded,285 Pennoyer didn’t try to “constitutionalize” jurisdiction, in the 
sense of elevating specific rules to constitutional status.  To the Court, 
jurisdictional doctrine was just a branch of the ordinary general law, one on 
which federal and state courts could amicably disagree.  What the Fourteenth 
Amendment changed wasn’t the status of the law of jurisdiction, but the 
consequences of that disagreement. 
The reason was that due process often depended on a court’s 
jurisdiction, full stop.  Due process is commonly thought to forbid 
deprivations of liberty or property without the lawful judgment of a properly 
authorized court.286  The insight underlying Pennoyer is that a court lacking 
in personal jurisdiction isn’t properly authorized, so it can’t issue a lawful 
judgment.  Relying on the judgment to take property away from the 
defendant, limit his or her liberty, and so on, works a deprivation without due 
process. 
As a result, even though it didn’t speak to jurisdiction directly, the 
Fourteenth Amendment altered the prevailing jurisdictional rules by 
adjusting the mechanisms of appellate review.  When determining the 
presence or absence of jurisdiction, courts of the United States would have to 
take an independent view of the general law, not bound by state statutes or 
by the decisions of state courts.  Should a state disagree with the federal 
courts, its judgment might appear—in federal eyes—to lack jurisdiction 
under general law, and so to threaten a violation of due process.  That meant 
the losing party could seek review in the Supreme Court, with the lack of 
Fourteenth Amendment due process providing the necessary federal 
question.  And because the state courts knew all this in advance, they would 
have to adopt the federal view of things, to avoid any future reversals.  In 
short, the Fourteenth Amendment effectively federalized the law of 
jurisdiction without anyone necessarily intending to.  It created an obligation 
 
284. Perdue, Scandal, supra note 20, at 499–500. 
285. See Perdue, Sovereignty, supra note 20, at 732. 
286. See infra section III(B)(1). 
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for state courts—one that hadn’t existed before—to follow the federal courts’ 
lead on questions of personal jurisdiction. 
The goal of this analysis isn’t to discover some gnostic “true meaning” 
of Pennoyer, much less to read the mind of Justice Field.  Instead, the goal is 
to put forward a plausible reading of Pennoyer—and, most importantly, to 
show why this sympathetic reconstruction would have been legally correct. 
A. Pennoyer Without the Fourteenth Amendment 
To see what Pennoyer changed, it’s important to start with what it took 
for granted.  This subpart explores Pennoyer as if it were a pre-Fourteenth 
Amendment case, showing why it would have been correctly decided on 
existing legal grounds. 
To start with, Pennoyer was a recognition case.  It stemmed from a 
default judgment of an Oregon state court, in a lawsuit by John Mitchell 
against Marcus Neff for unpaid legal fees.287  Neff having moved to 
California, process was served by publication under Oregon statutes.288  A 
default judgment issued and was executed against Neff’s land, which was 
eventually conveyed to Sylvester Pennoyer—against whom Neff, on 
returning, filed a diversity action in Oregon federal court.289  The trial court 
saw various defects in the publication process, but the Supreme Court held 
that all state-law requirements had been satisfied; the problem with the state 
judgment, if there was one, rested on “principle[s] of general, if not universal, 
law.”290 
Just as other federal courts had done before, the Court in Pennoyer 
examined the Oregon judgment as the tribunal of a separate sovereign, 
subject to international standards.  Except insofar as the states were 
“restrained and limited” by the Constitution, they still retained “the authority 
of independent States.”291  This authority was determined by reference to 
“principles of public law”292—a reference, in contemporary legalese, to 
international law.293  And among those principles, the Court stated, was the 
rule that “no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons 
or property without its territory,” such as by “extend[ing] its process beyond 
 
287. The best treatment of the facts and personalities involved is generally acknowledged to be 
Perdue, Scandal, supra note 20. 
288. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 716–17 (1878) (statement of the case); id. at 720 
(opinion of the Court). 
289. Id. at 715–16 (statement of the case). 
290. Id. at 720–21 (opinion of the Court). 
291. Id. at 722. 
292. Id. 
293. See Conison, supra note 3, at 1090; Drobak, supra note 24, at 1026 n.59; Weinstein, supra 
note 20, 180 n.45. 
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that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions.”294  
As the Court saw things, the Oregon judgment failed on both counts. 
1. Jurisdiction over Persons.—According to Pennoyer, before it could 
determine a nonresident’s “personal rights and obligations” (including, say, 
the obligation to pay legal fees), a state needed jurisdiction over the person.295  
This jurisdiction couldn’t be obtained by sending process “into another State, 
and summon[ing] parties there domiciled to leave its territory and respond to 
proceedings against them.”296  Nor would publishing the summons internally 
“create any greater obligation upon the non-resident to appear.”297 
These conclusions were entirely orthodox.  While Pennoyer’s views on 
personal service have had their share of historical criticism, other research 
has defended their general outlines.298  The standard nineteenth-century 
means of establishing in personam jurisdiction was to show the defendant’s 
subjection to the court, whether by voluntary appearance or by lawful service 
of a summons to appear.299  Mere notice to the defendant wasn’t enough.300  
To make the defendant “bound to appear” as a matter of general principle,301 
states needed to accomplish an official legal act, which they only had power 
to do within their own territories.302 
There were a few recognized exceptions to the rule, but not many.  States 
were seen as having more freedom to create novel service methods for their 
 
294. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. 
295. Id. at 732. 
296. Id. at 727. 
297. Id. 
298. Compare Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The 
“Power” Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 292 (1956) (arguing against a historical 
service requirement), and Hazard, supra note 14, at 271 (same), with Weinstein, supra note 20, at 
189–90 (arguing that the service requirement was well-established historically), and Nathan Levy, 
Jr., Mesne Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 52, 
94 (1968) (“The common law courts neither exercised nor believed they could exercise jurisdiction 
in personal actions without either physical custody of the defendant or an appearance by him.”). 
299. See, e.g., Nations v. Johnson, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 195, 205 (1860); Harris v. Hardeman, 55 
U.S. (14 How.) 334, 339 (1852); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 623 
(1838); Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 466, 472 (1830); Rogers v. Coleman, 3 Ky. 
(Hard.) 413, 424–25 (1808); Hall v. Williams, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 232, 241 (1828); Borden v. Fitch, 
15 Johns. 121, 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818); see also Levy, supra note 298, at 63 (describing the history 
of the summons). 
300. See Gerault v. Anderson, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 30, 34 (1818) (describing notice and authority 
as distinct requirements); accord Ewer v. Coffin, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 23, 28 (1848); Colvin v. Reed, 
55 Pa. 375, 380 (1867); Benton v. Burgot, 10 Serg. & Rawle 240, 241 (Pa. 1823); STORY, supra 
note 157, § 546, at 457–58. 
301. Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 612 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 
11,134). 
302. See Warren Mfg. Co. v. Etna Ins. Co., 29 F. Cas. 294, 298 (Thompson, Circuit Justice, 
C.C.D. Conn. 1837 [approximate date]) (No. 17,206) (holding that personal service beyond a state’s 
borders could have no legal effect); accord Ewer, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) at 28; Fenton v. Garlick, 8 
Johns. 194, 197 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811); Hitchcock v. Aicken, 1 Cai. 460, 484 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803) 
(opinion of Lewis, C.J.); Price v. Hickok, 39 Vt. 292, 296 (1866). 
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own citizens or residents, who had separate obligations to obey their own 
state’s laws.303  There were special rules for cases involving marriage or 
divorce,304 as well as for corporate defendants.305  But these subject-specific 
additions didn’t do much to change the general rule.  By the mid-nineteenth 
century, one Massachusetts court had called the matter “now too well settled 
to admit of discussion,” that if a defendant “is not served with process, and 
does not voluntarily appear and answer to the suit,” any resulting judgment 
“cannot be enforced against him out of the local jurisdiction.”306 
2. Jurisdiction over Property.—The other route to defending the 
Oregon judgment was as a judgment in rem.  Oregon unquestionably had 
power over Neff’s land within its borders, and the Supreme Court agreed that 
it could use that land to satisfy claims against its owner.307  But as Pennoyer 
saw things, states could exercise in rem jurisdiction after service by 
publication only “where property is once brought under the control of the 
court by seizure or some equivalent act.”308  Neff’s property was first brought 
under the court’s control as part of the process of execution, well after the 
judgment had issued.309  That meant the judgment, when it issued, wasn’t 
really in rem at all, but just an ordinary judgment for money damages. 
This analysis, too, was largely orthodox.  No state, the Court had held 
in 1844, “can arrogate to itself the power of disposing of real estate without 
the forms of law”; it had to “obtain jurisdiction of the thing in a legal 
mode.”310  Attaching property would be taken, other cases said, “as 
constructive notice to the whole world”—but only “where the proceeding is 
 
303. See Welch v. Sykes, 8 Ill. (3 Gilm.) 197, 201 (1846) (holding that a state’s new mode of 
process can be “binding on its own citizens”); Weaver v. Boggs, 38 Md. 255, 261 (1873) (describing 
constructive service as “binding upon persons domiciled within the State where such law prevails,” 
a rule “based upon international law”); see also Dearing v. Bank of Charleston, 5 Ga. 497, 510–11 
(1848) (construing a statute regarding service to apply only to English subjects, as “the citizen of 
each independent State should be liable to, and be protected by, the laws of the State to which he 
owes allegiance”); Sim v. Frank, 25 Ill. 125, 127 (1860) (stating that a Pennsylvania statute allowing 
judgment without notice or appearance “can only be binding upon citizens of that State”); Douglas 
v. Forrest (1828) 130 Eng. Rep. 933, 940; 4 Bing. 686, 703 (C.P.) (permitting a judgment by foreign 
attachment when “the party owed allegiance to the country,” by whose laws “his property was, at 
the time those judgments were given, protected”); Martin, supra note 256, at 7 (noting the 
commonly invoked “principle,” of which he strongly disapproved, that “every citizen is amenable 
to the laws of his country wherever he may be”). 
304. See, e.g., Colvin, 55 Pa. at 378–83. 
305. See, e.g., Warren Mfg. Co., 29 F. Cas. at 299; Moulin v. Trenton Mut. Life & Fire Ins. Co., 
24 N.J.L. 222, 234 (1853). 
306. Phelps v. Brewer, 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 390, 395–96 (1852); accord Sim, 25 Ill. at 127; 
Melhop v. Doane & Co., 31 Iowa 397, 406–07 (1871). 
307. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1878); see also Hall v. Williams, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 
232, 241 (1828) (“If the property of a citizen of another State, within its lawful jurisdiction, is 
condemned by lawful process there, the decree is final and conclusive.”). 
308. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727. 
309. Id. at 720. 
310. Shriver’s Lessee v. Lynn, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 43, 60 (1844). 
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strictly and properly in rem, and in which the thing condemned is first seized 
and taken into the custody of the court.”311  A state might skip attachment 
pursuant to statute when the case was “substantially, a proceeding in rem,” 
determining the ownership of specific property without leaving the defendant 
“personally bound.”312  But Mitchell’s judgment had let him execute against 
whatever property he could find—and a judgment in rem could not be used, 
per international standards, to establish that kind of personal debt.313 
To Justice Hunt, in dissent, the timing of attachment was “a matter not 
of constitutional power,” but only “of detail.”314  If Oregon had full power 
over Neff’s land, why care about when the writ issued?  Some cases (and 
state statutes) agreed with Hunt;315 but other cases agreed with Justice 
Field,316 who may have had the better of the argument.  It was black-letter 
law that a judgment without jurisdiction was void, not merely voidable.317  So 
the presence or absence of jurisdiction couldn’t depend, as Oregon law would 
have it, on property to be named later—“upon facts to be ascertained after 
[the court] has tried the cause and rendered the judgment.”318  To Field, 
 
311. Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 466, 475 (1830) (quoting the decision below, 
of which the court “unanimously approve[d],” see id. at 470). 
312. Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336, 348 (1850); see Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734 
(categorizing actions “to partition real estate, foreclose a mortgage, or enforce a lien” as 
“substantially proceedings in rem”); cf. Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308, 317 (1870) 
(describing the statutory attachment of real or intangible property without a physical seizure). 
313. See, e.g., Green v. Van Buskirk, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 139, 149 (1869) (describing a “manifest” 
distinction, “supported by authority,” between using foreign attachment proceedings to establish a 
claim against the debtor personally and merely to defend the seizure of the goods attached); id. at 
148 (“Of course Green could not sue Bates on it, because the court had no jurisdiction of his person; 
nor could it operate on any other property belonging to Bates than that which was attached.”); 
accord Boswell’s Lessee, 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 348; Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 612 (Story, 
Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134); Dearing v. Bank of Charleston, 5 Ga. 497, 513 
(1848); Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 462, 469 (1813); Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121, 142 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818). 
314. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 738, 748 (Hunt, J., dissenting). 
315. See id. at 738–40 (listing statutes); Jarvis v. Barrett, 14 Wis. 591, 594–95 (1861); see also 
Tocklin, supra note 10, at 132–34 (defending Hunt’s view). 
316. See Cooper, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 319 (“Without [seizing or attaching property] the court 
can proceed no further . . . .”); Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 437, 460 (1851) (describing 
certain judgments as “nullities,” because there was no “attachment or other proceeding against the 
land, until after the judgments”); Boswell’s Lessee, 50 U.S. at 348 (limiting the effect of in rem 
judgments to “property of the defendant, within the jurisdiction of the court”); see also Oakley, 
supra note 20, at 679–83 (defending at length the strength of authority on this point). 
317. Elliott v. Lessee of Peirsol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340 (1828); Filling the Void, supra note 
145, at 164. 
318. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 728 (majority opinion). Compare Borchers, supra note 1, at 40 
(arguing that Pennoyer was really a case about state law, as Justice Field “construed the Oregon 
Code to allow for personal jurisdiction . . . only in accordance with the territorial principles”), with 
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720 (construing Oregon’s damage cap to limit recoveries against absent 
property owners “to the extent of such property” at the time of suit, but not as limiting courts’ 
jurisdiction “only [to] such property,” and thereby permitting ordinary money judgments “having 
no relation to the property” so long as they didn’t exceed the determined amount), and id. at 733 
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Mitchell’s judgment didn’t run against hypothetical property that Neff might 
have already sold off, or that he might never have owned at all; it ran against 
Neff, establishing a personal liability, and so was void in international eyes. 
3. State Jurisdiction in Federal Court.—Hunt and Field’s dispute over 
attachment brought forward a deeper tension in the case.  The Court rejected 
Oregon’s judgment based on international standards.  But why did 
international standards matter?  As Hunt argued, this case wasn’t about “the 
faith and credit to be given in one State to a judgment recovered in another”; 
it was about “land lying in the same State” of Oregon.319  So why would a 
federal court in Oregon come to a different answer than a state one? 
Field asked the same question, but in the opposite direction.  If 
Mitchell’s judgment were really just “waste paper”320—if it were void ab 
initio, and not just voidable—why should it be valid in the state’s eyes?  As 
the Court wrote, “if the whole proceeding . . . is coram non judice and void; 
if to hold a defendant bound by such a judgment is contrary to the first 
principles of justice—it is difficult to see how the judgment can legitimately 
have any force within the State.”321  Field praised cases from the few states 
that had begun to incorporate the general rules as part of their own law—and 
that maintained, “as it always ought to have been,” that an exorbitant 
judgment “is not entitled to any respect in the State where rendered.”322  But 
why hadn’t this happened in every state? 
The answer, again, can be found in the special features of general law.  
On general-law questions, state and federal courts could agree to disagree.  
Neither of them controlled the other, and while there were advantages in 
uniformity, neither side had to blink first.  The correct legal answer in any 
particular case would depend on the forum in which the case was brought. 
This arrangement may seem bizarre to modern eyes, but it shouldn’t.  
Even today, courts are sometimes obliged to render different judgments on 
identical questions of law.  Suppose that a criminal defendant raises a good 
First Amendment defense that’s nonetheless barred by circuit precedent.  An 
appellate panel might then affirm the conviction, even while privately 
agreeing with the defendant.  Should the case be reheard en banc, the same 
judges might vote to vacate the panel decision and reverse the judgment—
even though the panel and the district court, by following circuit precedent, 
had done exactly what they were required to do.  In one sense, the district 
court “got it wrong”; the First Amendment doesn’t mean one thing at trial 
and another on appeal, or one thing before the panel and another en banc.  
 
(disapproving “the substituted service of process by publication, allowed by the law of Oregon and 
by similar laws in other States”). 
319. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 741 (Hunt, J., dissenting). 
320. Voorhees v. Jackson, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 449, 475 (1836). 
321. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732 (majority opinion). 
322. Id. 
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But in another sense, the district court “got it right”; it delivered the kind of 
decision that a court in its position was supposed to deliver.  (And had it 
followed its best lights on the First Amendment question, circuit precedent 
be damned, it would have been acting contrary to its legal obligations, all 
things considered.) 
Sometimes the law makes us take others’ views as authoritative, even if 
they’re potentially incorrect.  The Oregon court had to pay attention to 
Oregon’s statutes, including statutes that overrode the general law and 
expanded the state’s legislative and judicial powers.  But a federal court 
might not, if its reading of the general law put the outer limits of personal 
jurisdiction beyond Oregon’s power to legislate. 
Pennoyer explained this disagreement between state and federal courts 
with an eye to the available means of review.  Diverse parties could take their 
cases directly to federal court.  But when a state court applied its own state’s 
statutes, there had been “no mode of directly reviewing such judgment or 
impeaching its validity within the State where rendered.”323  General-law 
cases didn’t create federal-question jurisdiction,324 and without federal law 
on point, there was no possibility of Supreme Court review.  So the state 
judgment “could be called in question only when its enforcement was 
elsewhere attempted”;325 only a change in forum could produce a change in 
law. 
Once the question did arise in a different court, though—as in Neff’s 
federal suit to recover his land—that court could give a different answer.  
“[T]he courts of the United States,” wrote Field, “are not required to give 
effect to judgments of this character when any right is claimed under 
them.”326  The U.S. courts were “not foreign tribunals,” but they were 
“tribunals of a different sovereignty, exercising a distinct and independent 
jurisdiction,” and only “bound to give to the judgments of the State courts . . . 
the same faith and credit which the courts of another State are bound to give 
to them.”327  In other words, a federal court wasn’t required to take a state’s 
jurisdictional statutes at their word—and it would give state judgments the 
recognition they were due, not as a matter of state law, but as a matter of 
general law. 
Hunt’s argument does have some modern defenders.  Patrick Borchers, 
for example, argues that the federal courts sitting in each state were bound to 
follow that state’s jurisdictional law, even as they might reject similar 
 
323. Id. 
324. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
325. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732. 
326. Id. 
327. Id. at 732–33. 
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judgments from other states.328  Yet as Borchers notes,329 the 1790 Act applies 
to “every court within the United States”330—to federal courts as well as state 
ones.  If the Act is generally limited to internationally valid judgments, as 
D’Arcy held,331 it imposes no obligation on any federal court to respect a void 
judgment, whether in or out of the state that rendered it.332 
Numerous statements by the Supreme Court suggested that federal 
courts, as courts of a separate sovereignty, were supposed to subject every 
other court system to the same degree of scrutiny.  In Elliott v. Lessee of 
Peirsol, Attorney General Wirt had argued that the Circuit Court for the 
District of Kentucky “was not competent to inquire into the acts of the Court 
of the state of Kentucky,” by analogy to courts of the same system in 
Britain.333  As noted above, the Supreme Court specifically rejected that 
argument, stating that “[w]e know nothing in the organization of the Circuit 
Courts of the Union, which can contradistinguish them from other Courts, in 
this respect.”334  Likewise, in M‘Elmoyle v. Cohen, the Court denied that the 
1790 Act was “intended to exclude,” in “any Court in the United States,” 
defenses that “inquire into the jurisdiction of the Court in which the judgment 
was given,” regarding “the right of the state itself to exercise authority over 
the persons or the subject matter.”335  And in Baldwin v. Hale,336 the Court 
reasoned from the premise that state insolvency laws “have no extra-
territorial operation,” and that a state court “sitting under them” can give no 
“[l]egal notice” creating an “obligation to appear,” to the conclusion that the 
court would have “no jurisdiction” that could bind any other tribunal337—and 
so a discharge from the Court of Insolvency in Massachusetts applied only in 
Massachusetts state courts, and not “in the courts of the United States, or of 
any other State.”338 
This reasoning supports Justice Story’s decision in Flower v. Parker, 
when sitting on circuit in Massachusetts, to give the same scrutiny to a 
 
328. Patrick J. Borchers, Pennoyer’s Limited Legacy: A Reply to Professor Oakley, 29 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 115, 127 & n.61 (1995) [hereinafter Borchers, Limited Legacy]; Borchers, supra 
note 1, at 30–32, 36 n.115. 
329. Borchers, Limited Legacy, supra note 328, at 127. 
330. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. 
331. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
332. See Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290, 302 (1866) (describing the 1790 Act as 
“applicable in all similar cases where it appears that the court had jurisdiction of the cause, and that 
the defendant was duly served with process, or appeared and made defence”). 
333. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 331 (1828) (argument of counsel) (“This is not done by the Courts of 
King’s Bench, of England, in reference to the proceedings of Ecclesiastical Courts, or Courts of 
Common Pleas.”). 
334. Id. at 340 (majority opinion). 
335. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 326–27 (1839) (quoting Hampton v. M‘Connel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 
234, 235 (1818)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
336. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1863). 
337. Id. at 234. 
338. Id. at 230; see id. at 224 (statement of the case). 
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Massachusetts state judgment as to judgments from out of state.339  It also 
supports Justice Field’s conclusion prior to Pennoyer, addressing the issue 
on circuit in Galpin v. Page,340 that “[a]ll the circuit courts of the United 
States have the same relation to the state courts,” and would “examine into 
[their] jurisdiction” to the same extent, no matter where they sit.341  And, of 
course, the federal courts’ taking an independent view of any conflicts 
questions was standard practice prior to Klaxon.342 
At the same time, to my knowledge, there don’t seem to have been any 
open statements of Hunt’s view before Hunt’s dissent.  Judges sometimes 
paraphrased the language of the 1790 Act, stating blandly that state 
judgments would receive the same effect in federal court as in the court where 
they were rendered.343  But the 1790 Act required the same thing for every 
state judgment, local or distant—which is why M‘Elmoyle emphasized that 
the Act didn’t cover jurisdiction.  Other courts regularly spoke of recognition 
in geographic terms; a given judgment might be enforceable within a state, 
but “a dead letter beyond the territory within which it was pronounced.”344  
But of course state courts faced these issues only with respect to the 
judgments of other states; and while federal courts used the same refrain, 
they didn’t actually apply it as a rule.  Borchers cites a number of in-state 
federal recognition cases applying state rules of jurisdiction, yet each of them 
had other legal reasons to do so345—and none suggested that federal courts 
 
339. 9 F. Cas. 323, 324–25 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1823) (No. 4891). 
340. 9 F. Cas. 1126 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 5206). 
341. Id. at 1132. 
342. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
343. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 466, 471 (1830).  But see id. at 472, 
474–75 (concluding that the state judgment rested on service that was improper even on state-law 
principles, rendering it unnecessary to discuss what would have happened if those principles had 
contradicted “the general law of the land”). 
344. Hall v. Williams, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 232, 246 (1828). 
345. Some of these cases involved collateral attacks on the prior judgment’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction, which of course would depend on state law.  See Elliott v. Lessee of Peirsol, 26 U.S. 
(1 Pet.) 328, 340–41 (1828) (inquiring into a Kentucky court’s “authority over a subject,” as 
“derived wholly, from the statute law of the state”); Kempe’s Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 
173, 185–86 (1809) (inspecting “the constitution and powers of the [New Jersey] court in which 
this judgment [of treason] was rendered,” and looking to New Jersey statutes to determine that 
“[w]ith respect to treason, then, it is a court of general jurisdiction”).  Some found state law 
consistent with international law, so compliance with state law became the only question worth 
answering.  See Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308, 317–19 (1870) (determining that 
procedures established by state statute were consistent with general requirements for in rem 
jurisdiction); Voorhees v. Jackson, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 449, 470–72 (1836) (describing the process 
required by statute as more exacting than under the “general principles of law, by which the validity 
of sales made under judicial process must be tested”).  Some found that the plaintiff had failed to 
comply with state law, making it unnecessary to reach other issues.  See Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 
Wall.) 350, 372–73 (1874) (finding that “[t]he provisions mentioned were not strictly pursued,” as 
state law required); Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336, 350 (1850) (finding that “the 
requisites of the statute [had not] been complied with”).  Some fell into Pennoyer’s category of 
cases that were “substantially proceedings in rem,” 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878), in which compliance 
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were legally bound by the jurisdictional practices, no matter how exorbitant, 
of the state in which they sat.  
The strongest argument for Hunt’s view may be an argument from 
silence.  Why didn’t more out-of-state defendants challenge state judgments 
in this way?  Why didn’t they just default in the state court and then sue the 
winner right back in federal court—a strategy that might even survive 
modern limits on collateral attack?346  One answer, of course, is that some 
defendants did: this was essentially the strategy in Flower.  Another answer 
is that most out-of-state defendants were probably happy to sit at home and 
wait for the plaintiff to try to collect.  Suing abroad, even in federal court, 
meant the expense of distant litigation and the risk of a hostile jury; Flower 
brought his suit to recover money from his debtors, not just to challenge 
recognition in the abstract.  And, in any case, the rarity of a litigation strategy 
doesn’t always mean that the strategy was wrong.  (To my knowledge, 
scholars have turned up no antebellum examples of Supreme Court review of 
a state’s refusal to recognize a judgment under the 1790 Act—even though 
such challenges were legally available from the beginning.)347 
Given the absence of more direct statements of Hunt’s view, together 
with the presence of statements pointing the other way—as well as the actual 
application of federal scrutiny to in-state judgments in Flower and Galpin—
the preponderance of the evidence seems to favor Pennoyer, and the rule that 
federal courts could take their own view of state jurisdiction. 
B. The Fourteenth Amendment in Federal Court 
Immediately after establishing that federal courts could make their own 
judgments, Pennoyer delivered its most famous sentence: 
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly 
questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground 
that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights 
 
with local statutes was all that was required.  See Sargeant v. State Bank of Ind., 53 U.S. (12 How.) 
371, 383–87 (1851) (discussing the evidence admissible under state law in a collateral attack on a 
state court’s order to convey land); Steele’s Lessee v. Spencer, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 552, 559–60 (1828) 
(assessing the impact on third-party purchasers, under state law, of an injunction requiring the 
current owner to convey land).  And some concerned substantive state-law issues that were only 
indirectly related to jurisdiction, such as the evidentiary sufficiency of the record of a previous 
judgment, see Harvey v. Tyler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 328, 341–48 (1865), or the formalities for 
acknowledging a deed, see Deery v. Cray, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 795, 806–07 (1866) (looking to the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Maryland when rejecting an argument that a deed was void 
because it did not show compliance with “the law of Maryland then in force concerning the privy 
examination of married women”). 
346. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982); 
cf. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115 (1963) (preventing relitigation of subject-matter jurisdiction 
once the issue has been “fully litigated and judicially determined”). 
347. See supra text accompanying notes 238–56. 
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and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do 
not constitute due process of law.348 
This connection between jurisdictional standards and due process isn’t 
obvious.  Martin Redish, for example, has argued that there was no “historical 
link between due process and the concepts of federalism or interstate 
sovereignty,” at least “prior to its unexplained creation in Pennoyer v. 
Neff.”349  It’s true that there’s no direct link; the Due Process Clause isn’t a 
federalism provision.  But that doesn’t mean there’s no link at all.  Read 
another way, Pennoyer’s invocation of due process makes perfect sense: a 
judgment without jurisdiction is void, and property or liberty taken under a 
void judgment is taken without due process of law. 
The crucial point here is that due process doesn’t require any particular 
technique of obtaining personal jurisdiction.  It just requires jurisdiction, full 
stop.  Jurisdiction is what makes the process lawful, what gives the court legal 
power to take away property or liberty.  A judgment without jurisdiction is 
void, a piece of “waste paper.”350  And taking away someone’s property or 
liberty based on a piece of waste paper is, if anything is, a deprivation without 
due process of law. 
1. Due Process and Jurisdiction.—Even those quite skeptical of 
Pennoyer might agree that due process sometimes requires a properly 
constituted court.351  This is a familiar part of due process doctrine, 
particularly in cases about administrative tribunals and other entities at the 
edges of Article III.352  And it’s also a familiar part of ancient doctrine, dating 
at least from Bracton’s principle that “no one shall be disseised of his free 
tenement without a judgment.”353  From roughly the fourteenth century to 
 
348. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878). 
349. Redish, supra note 8, at 1120–21; accord Whitten, Part Two, supra note 12, at 818 
(arguing that “the traditional territorial rules” weren’t part of the original meaning of due process). 
350. Voorhees, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 475. 
351. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 14, at 270–71, 270 n.102 (criticizing the “logic and policy” 
of Pennoyer, but acknowledging that Justice Field’s assertion linking “limitations on state-court 
jurisdiction” with due process “rested on better ground in the precedent than is sometimes 
assumed”). 
352. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593 (1985) 
(suggesting that, under certain circumstances, some “Article III review” may be “required by due 
process considerations”); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 280 (1855) (associating due process with a “trial according to some settled course of 
judicial proceedings”); cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“If 
there be any controversy to which the judicial power extends that may not be subjected to the 
conclusive determination of administrative bodies or federal legislative courts, it is . . . because, 
under certain circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of 
judicial process.”); Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative 
Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 269 (1990) (describing “a fundamental congruence 
between the question whether the citizen has been afforded the judicial process that is ‘due’ and the 
question whether sufficient scope has been given to the ‘judicial’ power”). 
353. F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 316 & n.2 
(A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1910). 
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today, “due process” has “consistently referred to the guarantee of legal 
judgment in a case by an authorized court in accordance with settled law,” a 
sense that continued to be relevant as the phrase crossed the Atlantic and 
found its way into the Constitution.354  This doesn’t have to be all that “due 
process” means, of course—not by half.  But it is a core sense of the term.  If 
the Supreme Court was right to say that “‘due process of law’ generally 
implies and includes actor, reus, judex,”355 then it’s a real problem to find 
yourself coram non judice. 
a. Jurisdiction, Personal and Subject-Matter.—The vital clue to this 
theory of Pennoyer, as highlighted by Wendy Collins Perdue, is that the case 
refers equally to subject-matter as well as to personal jurisdiction.356  
According to Field, whatever other difficulties attend the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s words, “there can be no doubt of their meaning when applied 
to judicial proceedings.  They then mean a course of legal proceedings 
according to those rules and principles which have been established in our 
systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private 
rights.”357  For “such proceedings” to have “any validity” in establishing “the 
personal liability of the defendant,” they must be conducted by “a tribunal 
competent by its constitution—that is, by the law of its creation—to pass 
upon the subject-matter of the suit,” and the defendant “must be brought 
within its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary 
appearance.”358 
No one thinks that the Constitution includes any specific rules for the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of state courts.  (Say, that a small-claims court can 
only hear cases up to $10,000, and so on.)  Subject-matter jurisdiction is 
typically state law, which the Due Process Clause takes as it finds—just as, 
for example, it looks to state-law definitions of property.359  But this suggests 
that due process might not specify any particular rules for personal 
jurisdiction of state courts, either.  All that matters is that they have personal 
jurisdiction, in the eyes of the forum examining the judgment.  And if that 
forum is federal, the standards for personal jurisdiction may be drawn from 
the federal courts’ view of the general law.  In other words, due process isn’t 
a stand-in for a list of acceptable service methods; it’s a consequence of a 
 
354. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Essay, Due Process as Separation of 
Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1679 (2012). 
355. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 280 (emphasis omitted); cf. EDWARD COKE, THE 
FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 39 (London, Societie of Stationers 
1628) (describing “Actor, Reus, and Iudex” as requisite to a judgment). 
356. Perdue, Scandal, supra note 20, at 505–06. 
357. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878). 
358. Id. 
359. See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998). 
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court’s having subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, as defined by 
whatever other sources of law confer them.360 
b. Contemporary Readings.—Reading Pennoyer as requiring 
jurisdiction, full stop, makes more sense than reading it to treat any particular 
service rules as written in stone.  Pennoyer does cite a treatise by Thomas 
Cooley for the proposition that “due process of law would require appearance 
or personal service before the defendant could be personally bound by any 
judgment rendered.”361  But Cooley’s treatise repeatedly stated that due 
process depended on jurisdiction, not just on particular requirements 
involving personal service.362  And Cooley himself argued, soon after 
Pennoyer, that the range of state personal jurisdiction was partly defined by 
“an admitted principle in the law of nations,”363 not just by constitutional 
requirements.  So it’s at least as plausible to read Pennoyer’s quote from 
Cooley as simply carrying through an incorporation by reference.  Due 
process required various personal service rules, not as a (necessary) matter 
of definition, but as a (contingent) matter of implication—in light of the 
fundamental need for jurisdiction, full stop, as well as any particular legal 
standards for personal jurisdiction that happened to be in place. 
Indeed, that’s how a number of the early decisions applying Pennoyer 
spoke about the matter.  In 1889, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that 
if a court “has no jurisdiction,” then “no part of such procedure would 
constitute due process of law”—in which case “the recent amendment to the 
federal constitution illegalizes the entire affair.”364  In 1897, the Ohio 
Supreme Court explained Pennoyer’s personal-service requirement as resting 
“on the ground that the proceedings of a court of justice to determine personal 
rights and obligations of one over whom it has no jurisdiction is not due 
process of law.”365  And in 1908, the Supreme Court itself identified two 
requirements of procedural due process: that the court “shall have 
jurisdiction” (for which it cited Pennoyer, among other cases), and that the 
parties be given “notice and opportunity for hearing.”366 
 
360. See Perdue, Scandal, supra note 20, at 506; Perdue, Sovereignty, supra note 20, at 732. 
361. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF 
THE AMERICAN UNION 405 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868)). 
362. See COOLEY, supra note 361, at 358 (“If in these cases the court has jurisdiction, they 
proceed in accordance with the law of the land . . . .”); id. at 397–98 (stating that “the question, what 
constitutes due process of law,” is “not so difficult” as to courts, for “[t]he proceedings in any court 
are void if it wants jurisdiction”—both subject-matter and personal—“of the case in which it has 
assumed to act”). 
363. Thomas M. Cooley, The Remedies for the Collection of Judgments Against Debtors Who 
Are Residents or Property Holders in Another State, or Within the British Dominions, 31 AM. L. 
REG. (o.s.) 697, 700 (1883). 
364. Elasser v. Haines, 18 A. 1095, 1097 (N.J. 1889). 
365. Kingsborough v. Tousley, 47 N.E. 541, 543 (Ohio 1897) (emphasis added). 
366. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110–11 (1908). 
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c.  Jurisdiction Under State Law.—This theory might seem to prove too 
much.  If the key issue is jurisdiction, full stop, won’t the Supreme Court be 
overwhelmed with garden-variety jurisdictional defects?  Does every case in 
which a state court lacked jurisdiction, whether personal or subject-matter, 
really pose a due process problem too? 
Only sort of.  It is a problem for a defendant to be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.  And if a state court actually 
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, then its judgment doesn’t provide due 
process.  But that doesn’t mean the case would—or should—be reviewed by 
the Supreme Court. 
As noted above, every incorrect construction of state contract law is a 
potential Contracts Clause problem; every wrong decision about public 
property is a potential takings problem; and so on.367  Yet we don’t expect 
the Supreme Court to hear all these cases.  That’s because these federal issues 
are premised on errors of state law, arising only on the assumption that the 
state courts got their own law wrong.  The Supreme Court usually doesn’t 
second-guess state courts in this way,368 unless it suspects some kind of 
“evasion” of a federal right.369  So long as the state decision “rests upon a fair 
or substantial basis,” it’ll be taken as authoritative370—in which case the 
Court could only conclude that there was in fact no error, and so no failure 
of due process. 
By contrast, Pennoyer’s doctrines of personal jurisdiction weren’t state 
law in this sense.  They were pure questions of general law—which the 
federal courts could look to directly, both because Congress hadn’t legislated 
on the topic and because, under the conflicts principles applicable in federal 
courts, no state could rewrite the jurisdictional rules on its own.  So if a state 
supreme court wrongly upheld the trial court’s jurisdiction—as a matter of 
general law, or even as a matter of state statute—the Supreme Court could 
still look past that court’s decisions and come to its own view. 
At the same time, this understanding doesn’t open the door to full 
federal review of all state decisions involving general law.  State courts have 
an obligation to faithfully apply their own state’s law—not only local law, 
but also any general-law rules that the state incorporates by reference.  On 
most topics (torts, contracts, etc.), the state is perfectly competent to depart 
from the general law by statute.  And where it isn’t, or where the state has 
chosen to leave the general law in place, not every state-court mistake in 
applying the general law will create a due process problem.  A judgment with 
 
367. See supra text accompanying note 244. 
368. See Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 159 (1825) (noting that, “in cases 
depending on the laws of a particular State,” the Court would uniformly “adopt the construction 
which the Courts of the State have given to those laws,” rather than suggest that other courts “had 
misunderstood their own statutes”). 
369. Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina ex rel. Daniel, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930). 
370. Id. 
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proper jurisdiction may be erroneous and liable to correction on appeal; but 
it isn’t void, and its execution raises no due process problem.  Pennoyer 
worked as it did only because both key elements were present: jurisdictional 
concerns that implicated due process, as well as general-law rules on which 
the federal courts were forced to reach their own conclusions. 
This interpretation explains why the Court still sometimes looks past 
state assertions of subject-matter jurisdiction.  For example, try as it might, a 
state court can’t reassign title to land in another state,371 nor bar a witness 
from testifying elsewhere372—even if the state declares itself competent to do 
so, and even if the parties have fully litigated the issue and lost before the 
state courts.373  In cases where the whole state system lacks authority to decide 
a particular matter,374 the Court will prevent the state court (in Chief Justice 
Marshall’s words) from “exercis[ing] a jurisdiction which, according to the 
law of nations, its sovereign could not confer.”375  In these exceptional cases, 
in which the general law actually does place limits on subject-matter 
jurisdiction, the Court can and does take an independent view. 
2. Pennoyer’s Puzzles, Explained.—Understanding due process as 
requiring jurisdiction, full stop—and understanding jurisdiction as governed 
by general law—gives us an easy way to resolve a number of longstanding 
confusions about Pennoyer.  Why did the connection between jurisdiction 
and due process only emerge with the Fourteenth Amendment, and not 
earlier?  Why would a lawsuit infringe a liberty interest on one side of a state 
border, and not the other?  How can personal jurisdiction be waivable, if it’s 
a function of sovereign authority?  And how do we reconcile grand theories 
of due process with the archaic exceptions and encrustations of the law of 
jurisdiction?  Thinking of the problem in terms of general law may help solve 
all four. 
a. Timing.—The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has been with 
us from the beginning; so have many state equivalents.  But only one state 
court explicitly held that its own due process clause limited jurisdiction, and 
that wasn’t until halfway through the nineteenth century.376  Why didn’t 
anyone draw this connection earlier? 
 
371. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1909). 
372. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 239 (1998). 
373. Compare Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 116 (1963) (barring collateral attack for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction when the issue had been “fully and fairly litigated”), with id. at 114 n.12 
(recognizing exceptions when “the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was clear” or “the 
policy against the court’s acting beyond its jurisdiction is strong” (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) 
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 451(2) (AM. LAW INST. Supp. 1948) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
374. Cf. McDonald v. Or. R.R. & Navigation Co., 233 U.S. 665, 670 (1914) (suggesting that 
the Court could consider “contentions address[ed] . . . to the subject-matter of jurisdiction . . . in the 
sense of the fundamental absence of any and all right to take cognizance of the cause”). 
375. Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 276 (1808) (Marshall, C.J.). 
376. See Beard v. Beard, 21 Ind. 321, 324, 328 (1863) (holding that the “due course of law” 
clause of the Indiana Constitution required personal service of process on nonresidents). 
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Pennoyer’s theory offers a potential answer.  Think of the state clauses.  
If due process just requires jurisdiction, full stop, and a state court thinks it 
has jurisdiction on state-law grounds, then there’s no due process problem 
under the state constitution.  (And if it doesn’t have jurisdiction on state-law 
grounds, then it rules on those grounds, without reaching the state-
constitutional question.)  The same goes for sister-state recognition: sister 
states would deny recognition to an exorbitant judgment on general-law 
grounds long before it might pose a problem for their own due process 
clauses. 
It’s equally hard to imagine a case in which the issue could have arisen 
under the Fifth Amendment.  The Judiciary Act of 1789 limited federal 
original jurisdiction to areas that were perfectly safe on general-law 
principles; anything unusual would lose on statutory grounds first.  State 
assertions of jurisdiction couldn’t violate the Fifth Amendment directly.  And 
if some federal trial court had wrongly decided to recognize a state judgment 
that violated international standards, the Supreme Court would have reversed 
based on those standards, not based on the Fifth Amendment.  Again, there’d 
never have been a reason to reach the constitutional ground. 
b. Interests.—The Due Process Clause is concerned with 
“depriv[ations]” of “life, liberty, or property.”377  In modern personal 
jurisdiction cases, we normally identify the deprivation as the order to appear 
in some distant state, or perhaps the imposition of the judgment per se.  Due 
process is said to “protect[] an individual’s liberty interest in not being 
subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no 
meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’”378  But why would these contacts or 
relations be relevant to a liberty interest?  Individual rights are about the 
individual—and an individual defendant has no more liberty when bossed 
around by one state than by another. 
In fact, the Court explained the problems with this modern view soon 
after Pennoyer.  In York v. Texas,379 a state statute made any appearance in 
the Texas courts—even a limited one objecting to jurisdiction—equivalent to 
a general appearance that consented to jurisdiction.380  The defendant claimed 
that this procedure violated due process.381  The Court agreed that it would 
be “more convenient” for the defendant to contest jurisdiction in the first suit, 
rather than defaulting and challenging recognition later.382  But the state 
 
377. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
378. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)); see also Drobak, supra note 24, at 1046 (describing the 
view that “the defendant’s liberty” is “affected by his forced participation in a lawsuit,” the “time, 
effort, and cost” of which “intrude on a defendant’s personal life”). 
379. 137 U.S. 15 (1890). 
380. Id. at 19. 
381. Id. at 19–20. 
382. Id. at 21. 
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offered a variety of other remedies, too: if any property were to be seized, he 
could seek to enjoin the execution; or he could wait and sue for its return, 
with the invalid judgment giving the other side no defense.383 
What made these remedies adequate was that they would prevent a 
“depriv[ation] . . . of liberty [and] property,”384 which is what the Due 
Process Clause was all about.  According to the Court, “the mere entry of a 
judgment for money, which is void for want of proper service,” wasn’t the 
deprivation in question; it was a legal nullity, an empty breath.385  Only 
“when process is issued thereon or the judgment is sought to be enforced” 
would “liberty or property [be] in present danger.  If at that time of immediate 
attack protection is afforded, the substantial guarantee of the amendment is 
preserved, and there is no just cause of complaint.”386 
York’s explanation makes much more sense than current doctrine.  What 
the Constitution protects isn’t the defendant’s liberty to sit peacefully at 
home, or to exercise his arms by throwing a foreign summons (but not a local 
summons!) in the trash.  Rather, the things protected are the things the 
judgment orders taken away: property, liberty, and so on.  Any one of these 
might be taken away, but only with “due process of law”—including the 
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, and not just some piece of 
“waste paper.”  The constitutional “depriv[ation]” is the execution, not the 
judgment. 
That said, the judgment itself can still be challenged on due process 
grounds.  Courts can’t lawfully issue judgments that are unlawful to execute: 
a defendant can ask the Supreme Court to declare a void judgment to be void 
precisely because it threatens an unlawful deprivation, contrary to rights set 
up under the Constitution.  Suppose a state court issued a $500 judgment out 
of the blue, against someone who hadn’t even been sued.  The execution of 
that judgment would violate due process—an excellent reason for an 
appellate court to vacate the judgment ordering it, even before any money 
changes hands.  (As one Louisiana court put it, “if any judgment based on 
such substituted service would be an absolute nullity, incapable of any effect 
whatever against the person or property of defendant, it would be mere folly 
to permit the ear of the Court to be vexed with such useless and 
inconsequential proceedings.”)387  But the judgment in York posed no such 
problem.  If the trial court really had personal jurisdiction, then Texas’s lack 
of a special appearance procedure to raise the issue didn’t itself reflect an 
independent due process concern.  But if jurisdiction really were absent, then 
 
383. Id. 
384. Id. at 20 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). 
385. Id. 
386. Id.; accord Kauffman v. Wootters, 138 U.S. 285, 287 (1891). 
387. Laughlin v. La. & New Orleans Ice Co., 35 La. Ann. 1184, 1185 (1883). 
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any subsequent proceeding involving the judgment would have to recognize 
it as invalid—and a failure to do so would be reviewable in federal court. 
Indeed, the same would be true in a recognition case in state court.  
Suppose that Mitchell had carried his Oregon default judgment into 
California, filing a state-court action to enforce the judgment and serving 
Neff in person.  The California court might reject the prior judgment on 
general-law grounds.  But if it didn’t, without the Fourteenth Amendment, 
there was nothing Neff could do; it would just be an ordinary error by a 
California court on a question of general law.  With the Amendment in place, 
though, the new judgment involves a due process problem: the California 
court, no less than the Oregon one, would be threatening to take away Neff’s 
property based on a piece of waste paper.388  (That said, because the 
California court really would have had personal jurisdiction over Neff, its 
judgment would be merely erroneous, not void; and if Neff failed to seek 
Supreme Court review, he couldn’t collaterally attack the California 
judgment in some third proceeding.)389 
c.  Waiver.—Unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction is 
waivable.  Yet if jurisdiction really reflects limits on state authority, how can 
an individual choose to waive it?  How could a private person “change the 
powers of sovereignty”?390 
The general-law approach obviates this concern.  Whether an issue is 
waivable depends on the particular legal standard involved, not on the 
abstract category to which it belongs.391  As the law currently stands, parties 
can’t confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a federal court; but Congress could 
still structure its jurisdictional statutes to create some opportunities for 
waiver.  Suppose Congress amended the diversity statute to state that “the 
required amount-in-controversy is usually $75,000, but anything over 
$20,000 is fine unless the defendant timely objects.”  That’s neither 
incoherent, nor unconstitutional, nor legally impossible: it just sets a different 
 
388. See Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 50 (1894) (agreeing that a state can’t declare “a judicial 
determination . . . made in [a party’s] absence, and without any notice to or process issued against 
him, conclusive for the purpose of divesting him of his property,” as that would “deprive him of 
property without any process of law whatever” (quoting Lavin v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 1 F. 
641, 662 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880))); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1878) (stating that “to hold a 
defendant bound by such a judgment is contrary to the first principles of justice”). 
389. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 & cmt.c (AM. LAW INST. 1942) (noting 
that the “second judgment, although not void and not open to collateral attack,” is still “subject to 
reversal in the Supreme Court . . . on the ground that the rendition of the second judgment, as well 
as the rendition of the first judgment, is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States”). 
390. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982). 
391. See Stephen E. Sachs, The Forum Selection Defense, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
1, 7 (2014) (explaining that courts recognize venue waivers not “because contract law somehow 
trumps procedure, or because the parties are somehow entitled to override whatever the law actually 
requires,” but because “our procedural law just happens to recognize a role for private 
understandings when allowing rights to be waived”). 
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kind of rule.  So whether personal jurisdiction is waivable depends on 
whether the general law says it is.  If so, there’s no mystery to be explained. 
(Separately, personal jurisdiction might be inherently “waivable” to the 
extent that the doctrine involves the court’s power to force an appearance.392  
A defendant outside the court’s reach can always appear anyway—in which 
case the doctrinal requirements would be satisfied, not ignored.) 
d. Arbitrariness.—One occasionally embarrassing feature of personal 
jurisdiction involves what one scholar calls the “special jurisdictional rules” 
that apply in particular areas, such as “divorce, real property, and penal 
law.”393  These rules leave the doctrine “marbled with elements that, if 
explicable in due process terms at all, can only be so explained with a great 
deal of effort.”394  It’s an impossible task to assemble a clean, theoretically 
coherent approach to due process that also predicts all these doctrinal 
hangers-on.  (Out of the crooked timber of jurisdictional doctrine, no straight 
thing was ever made.) 
Fortunately, a conventional standard of general law doesn’t have to 
follow from any grand theory—whether of consent, sovereignty, fairness, or 
anything else.  Customary standards are customary, which means that they 
can be just as strange as the societies that produced them.  So it’s not 
surprising to see various old doctrines crawl out of the woodwork now and 
then, even if they detract from the coherence of the system as a whole. 
C. The Fourteenth Amendment in State Court 
As discussed so far, Pennoyer’s reasoning rested on two pillars.  Due 
process requires that state courts have jurisdiction, full stop, which federal 
courts will assess based on their own view of the general law.  The third 
pillar, the one that held up the whole, was the system of appellate review.  
With the Fourteenth Amendment in place, a state judgment that violated 
general standards would also be held to violate due process, providing for 
federal-question jurisdiction and a route to Supreme Court review.  
This meant that state courts, if they wanted to avoid reversal, needed to 
change their jurisdictional practices.  Instead of taking their own view of the 
general law (let alone abrogating it by statute), states now had to hew to the 
Supreme Court’s view of things—including its view of the reach of state law. 
1. Due Process and Appellate Review.—As noted above, before the 
Fourteenth Amendment, there was no direct federal review of state courts’ 
personal jurisdiction.  Questions of general law weren’t federal questions;395 
all the parties could do was to wait for the recognition stage, in which a new 
 
392. See Nelson, supra note 166, at 1568–74. 
393. Weinstein, supra note 20, at 222–23 (footnotes omitted). 
394. Id. at 249. 
395. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286–87 (1875). 
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lawsuit might qualify for diversity jurisdiction or raise a question under the 
1790 Act. 
After the Fourteenth Amendment, though, a case in state court could be 
taken to the Supreme Court, on a claim that the underlying judgment lacked 
personal jurisdiction and so threatened a deprivation without due process.  
The specific standards to be applied were still drawn from general law; 
jurisdiction hadn’t become a federal question in that sense.396  But federal 
law required compliance with those standards, whatever they were—and a 
state decision that failed to comply with them would be “against the title, 
right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed” under federal 
law.397  (Consider, as above, how the 1790 Act was read to require 
recognition of valid state judgments; the Supreme Court might review a 
state’s failure on this ground, even though the substantive standards of 
validity weren’t themselves federal law.)398  As the Court described it in 
1899, “[t]he Federal question with which we are now concerned is whether 
the [state] court obtained jurisdiction to render judgment in the case against 
the [defendant] so that to enforce it would not be taking the property of the 
[defendant] without due process of law.”399  Or to put it another way, due 
process functioned as a “hook” to get a general-law case into federal court.400 
The most important feature of Pennoyer’s “hook” wasn’t just the new 
route to federal review.  It was the effect of that review—whether for legal 
reasons or just in terrorem—on decisions in the state courts.  The standards 
for jurisdiction weren’t constitutional: they didn’t stem from the Due Process 
Clause.  But once state courts realized that their own views of general law 
might be reversed as erroneous, they started to adopt the federal ones instead. 
2. Appellate Review and Judicial Deference.—Even before the federal 
judiciary declared itself “supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution,”401 state courts regularly looked to Supreme Court decisions in 
the interest of not being reversed.  On a question within the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction, one Massachusetts court wrote in 1822, “that court has the final 
 
396. See Whitten, Part Two, supra note 12, at 820 (considering and dismissing the possibility 
that traditional territorial rules of personal jurisdiction “are incorporated in the meaning of due 
process”). 
397. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86. 
398. See supra section II(C)(3). 
399. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 609 (1899); see also Nat’l Exch. Bank 
of Tiffin v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 261–62 (1904) (considering only “the part of the defense which 
distinctly raises a Federal question,” namely that the Ohio court’s judgment was rendered “entirely 
without authority or jurisdiction,” and so “could not be upheld consistently with the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States”). 
400. Perdue, Sovereignty, supra note 20, at 731; accord Oakley, supra note 20, at 625–26; 
Trangsrud, supra note 20, at 879; cf. Kreutzer, supra note 23, at 221 (accusing Pennoyer of 
“pretend[ing]” to treat the Due Process Clause as such a hook, when the Court was actually 
transforming the substantive law of jurisdiction). 
401. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
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and conclusive authority; so that their decision must be taken to be the law 
of the land.”402  Maybe it’d be otherwise, a later court reasoned, if the Court 
were “restrained by the smallness of the sum in controversy”; but if “the case 
itself . . . may be carried to that court by writ of error,” then the “law, thus 
settled, is binding upon this Court.”403 
This reasoning is highly practical: there’s no point in a court issuing a 
ruling that it knows will be reversed.  It also helps make sense of the lines of 
judicial authority.  In the days of Swift v. Tyson, it wasn’t always obvious 
which courts would defer to which others on which issues; appellate review 
provided one easy test.  Just as district courts today will “follow the holdings 
of the Federal Circuit in cases falling within [that Circuit’s] appellate 
jurisdiction,”404 and will follow the holdings of their own geographic circuit 
courts otherwise, state courts would apply the Supreme Court’s views in any 
case subject to that Court’s review.  This understanding followed from a 
simple “postulate,” namely “that one rule must prevail in the court of original 
jurisdiction and in the court of last resort”405—a postulate that works just as 
well regardless of what kind of law is involved. 
This is exactly how some contemporaries regarded Pennoyer.  Consider 
the evidence of Volume 59 of the Tennessee reports, printed in 1878.  After 
reporting the five-year-old case of Barrett v. Oppenheimer,406 which refused 
to enforce a sister-state judgment founded on improper service,407 the reporter 
included a long footnote summarizing what was then the Supreme Court’s 
very recent decision in Pennoyer.408  It described Pennoyer as holding that 
judgments in violation of the traditional rules “were void, upon general 
principles,” and also under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.409  In particular, it addressed the question of how state courts should 
respond.  Noting that Pennoyer let other states provide their own statutory 
methods of service on their own citizens, it invoked a line of case law about 
the methods of ascertaining those other states’ laws, arguing that state courts 
should choose such methods “by the same rule which is to determine the 
appellate court on a writ of error”—namely that of the Supreme Court, 
 
402. Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 515, 546 (1822). 
403. Braynard v. Marshall, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 194, 196–97 (1829).  On the dispute over whether 
the amount-in-controversy requirement added to section 22 of the Judiciary Act carried over to 
section 25, see Buel v. Van Ness, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 312, 322–23 (1823), and Kevin C. Walsh, In 
the Beginning There Was None: Supreme Court Review of State Criminal Prosecutions, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1867, 1888–91 (2015). 
404. Rates Tech. Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., 685 F.3d 163, 174 n.9 (2d Cir. 2012). 
405. Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1, 6 (1885). 
406. 59 Tenn. (12 Heisk.) 298 (1873). 
407. Id. at 304. 
408. Id. at 304 n.*. 
409. Id. at 304–05 n.*. 
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“where the case is ultimately cognizable.”410  In other words, courts should 
adopt Pennoyer’s view of the “general principles” not solely on its own 
merits, but also to avoid inconsistency with the ultimate court of review. 
3. Judicial Deference in State Court.—This institutional account of the 
duty to follow Pennoyer may help explain its uneven reception in state courts.  
Some state courts took to it immediately, while others resisted for decades.  
If Pennoyer were just a straightforward analysis of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, that division would have been very odd.  But because Pennoyer 
in fact had a number of important moving parts, it’s easy to see why some 
state courts might have understood or accepted them sooner than others. 
a. Reception.—Some state courts quickly saw Pennoyer as affecting 
their approach to the general law.  Indeed, one of the earliest state decisions 
described the situation in almost precisely these terms. 
In Belcher v. Chambers,411 a nonresident of California had been served 
by publication under California law.412  He then mounted a collateral attack 
on the default judgment by challenging its execution in state court.413  Under 
prior California decisions, the court would have upheld the judgment, 
presuming that the defendant had somehow received adequate service.414  
And if this were merely a matter of state law, like interpreting a state statute, 
the federal courts might do the same—trusting the state courts to understand 
their own law. 
But state courts’ jurisdiction was no longer just a matter of state law.  As 
Justice Field had previously ruled on circuit, presumptions affecting 
jurisdiction were matters of general law—and if a federal court ever got hold 
of the case, it would take a different view of the general law and make the 
opposite presumption.415  With the Fourteenth Amendment in place, the 
federal courts would get hold of the case, because they could use due process 
to “re-examine every judgment of this Court” involving personal 
jurisdiction.416  So to avoid unnecessary reversal, the opinion reasoned, 
California’s courts should follow their “practice” of always “adopt[ing] that 
view of a legal question which has been taken by the Supreme Court,” 
whenever “the question involved” might arrive there by writ of error.417 
Viewed with modern eyes, the opinion in Belcher is most surprising for 
what it didn’t say: that the Fourteenth Amendment actually imposes any 
 
410. Id. at 306 n.* (citing Baxley v. Linah, 16 Pa. 241 (1851)); see also Hanley, 116 U.S. at 5–
7 (correcting errors in that line of case law but endorsing its underlying premise). 
411. 53 Cal. 635 (1879). 
412. Id. at 636 (statement of the case). 
413. Id. 
414. Id. at 640 (majority opinion). 
415. Id. (citing Galpin v. Page, 9 F. Cas. 1126, 1131 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1874) 
(No. 5206)). 
416. Id. at 643. 
417. Id. at 642–43. 
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substantive restrictions on state-court jurisdiction.  We’re used to the idea of 
following federal courts for federal law, state courts for state law, and so on.  
But the court bypassed substantive questions like that for purely institutional 
ones: what legal issues were involved, who would get to decide them, and 
how they would make their decisions.  Or, as it helpfully summarized: 
(1)  A writ of error will issue from the Supreme Court . . . . 
(2)  In such proceeding, the Supreme Court . . . will not follow the rule 
of the Supreme Court of California . . . , but will declare the law as 
announced in Galpin v. Page and Pennoyer v. Neff. 
(3)  To accord with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, the judgment . . . in the present action must be held to be null 
and void. 
(4)  When our judgment must depend upon a question which may be 
reëxamined by the Supreme Court . . . , we will follow the rule of law 
laid down by that Court.418 
Again, the court wasn’t following the Supreme Court’s reading of 
federal law; Galpin was a pre-Fourteenth Amendment case.  It was following 
the Supreme Court’s lead on a question of general law—and none too 
willingly at that.  Several other state courts did the same.419 
Commentators noticed the same thing.  In the 1881 edition of his treatise 
on judgments,420 A.C. Freeman described Pennoyer in what might seem a 
very curious way.  He didn’t say that Pennoyer altered any actual 
jurisdictional rules.  Rather, he described the consequence of Pennoyer’s 
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment (assuming that it would stick) as being 
that “all questions regarding the [personal] jurisdiction of courts . . . must 
ultimately be determined in the national courts, or at least according to the 
principles there recognized and applied”—so that the “wide dissimilarity” in 
state rules “must ultimately disappear.”421  If one thinks that the Fourteenth 
Amendment constitutionalized personal service, that’s a strange way of 
 
418. Id. at 643. 
419. See Eliot v. M‘Cormick, 10 N.E. 705, 710 (Mass. 1887) (noting that, “[a]s the question 
before us depends upon the construction of a provision of the federal constitution”—the standard 
for Supreme Court review under section 25 of the Judiciary Act—“our decision, if against the 
exemption or privilege claimed under that provision, would be subject to be re-examined by the 
[Supreme Court] upon a writ of error”); Elmendorf v. Elmendorf, 44 A. 164, 165 (N.J. Ch. 1899) 
(“[I]nasmuch as the decisions of the United States supreme court control state courts as to [the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s] construction and application, a judgment within the terms of the 
amendment as so construed is no longer valid within the state . . . .”); Kingsborough v. Tousley, 47 
N.E. 541, 543 (Ohio 1897) (“Whether the enforcement of such a judgment . . . violates the 
constitutional provisions referred to, is a federal question, with respect to which the state courts are 
necessarily controlled by the decisions of the national supreme court.”). 
420. 1 A.C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS (S.F., A.L. Bancroft & Co. 
3d. ed. 1881). 
421. Id. § 561, at 591 (emphasis added). 
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saying it.422  But it’s a relatively straightforward way of saying that the 
Amendment made the need for jurisdiction into a federal question, which the 
Court would answer based on its own view of the general law—or, as another 
scholar put it, that the Amendment “impose[d] upon the state courts a duty to 
conform their decisions to what the Supreme Court regards as correct 
principles of the conflict of laws.”423 
b. Resistance and Reconciliation.—The reception of Pennoyer wasn’t 
entirely smooth.  A number of state courts, particularly in New York and 
North Carolina, obstinately rejected Pennoyer’s due process language—
holding that they could do what they wished within their own states,424 until 
the Court finally reversed them in 1915.425  Some interpret this response, and 
the Supreme Court’s equivocal rhetoric in subsequent cases, as reflecting 
persistent uncertainty about Pennoyer’s commitment to independent review 
in federal courts.426  But the odds seem low that the Supreme Court would 
flip-flop so many times in succession, without even commenting on the 
change in doctrine.  A better explanation may just be that the states were able 
to get away with resisting dicta, and various procedural constraints delayed 
the point at which Pennoyer’s dicta crystallized into holding. 
First, and most simply, Pennoyer’s discussion of the Due Process Clause 
really was dicta.  The problem wasn’t that Mitchell’s original judgment 
predated the Fourteenth Amendment, as is often thought; the problem was 
that the case arose from Neff’s federal suit to undo the sale, filed in the 
Circuit Court for the District of Oregon.427  That federal court couldn’t violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment if it wanted to—and it applied the same general 
standard of review to the Oregon judgment as it would have applied to a 
judgment from Ontario, even though Ontario isn’t subject to the Fourteenth 
Amendment either.  In other words, Pennoyer would have reached the same 
 
422. Cf. Borchers, Limited Legacy, supra note 328, at 159–60 (highlighting Freeman’s treatise 
as evidence of uncertainty regarding Pennoyer’s holding). 
423. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the 
Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 HARV. L. REV. 533, 533 (1926) (emphasis added); see also id. at 533–
34 (“Since the Federal Constitution is silent as to the requirements for jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court has been obliged to seek for these elsewhere, and it has sought for and found them in 
principles of conflict of laws.”). 
424. See, e.g., Menefee v. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills, 76 S.E. 741, 743 (N.C. 1912) 
(disagreeing with the Supreme Court as to the validity of service on a corporate representative); see 
also Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 87 N.Y. 137, 140 (1881) (same); cf. Grant v. Cananea 
Consol. Copper Co., 82 N.E. 191, 192–93 (N.Y. 1907) (acknowledging that “in so far as the service 
of process is concerned, the decisions of our own court are not in entire accord with those of the 
Supreme Court of the United States”). 
425. See Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1915). 
426. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 1, at 43–51 (canvassing the period’s case law and arguing 
that “Pennoyer left the matter of whether there was a general constitutional limitation on the reach 
of state courts in splendid ambiguity”). 
427. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 715 (1878) (statement of the case); Perdue, Scandal, 
supra note 20, at 500 n.142. 
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outcome with or without the Amendment in place, which is enough to make 
dicta of its discussion of due process.  We might understand Field’s interest 
in including the discussion nonetheless; the logic here is complicated enough 
to warrant signaling it to other courts up front, rather than waiting for some 
enterprising attorney to build the whole Rube Goldberg machine from 
scratch.  But the fact that the discussion was dicta also limited its immediate 
impact on state courts. 
Second, there were sound procedural reasons for the Supreme Court not 
to mention due process in every case.  In cases arising from federal trial 
courts, the Fourteenth Amendment wasn’t an issue;428 so the Court often 
discussed jurisdictional issues without mentioning the Amendment,429 or 
without taking any position on whether state judgments could now be 
“directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted.”430  The 
same was sometimes true when it reviewed state courts’ failure to give Full 
Faith and Credit effect to another state’s judgment, which again required no 
consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment.431  By contrast, when the Court 
reviewed state courts directly, it made no secret of the constitutional standard 
that applied.432  It’s unclear why more litigants didn’t press the issue earlier, 
 
428. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (discussing what “[n]o State shall” do) (emphasis 
added)). 
429. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41, 44 (1892) (discussing Pennoyer’s principles 
but not the Fourteenth Amendment); accord Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 320, 326 (1890); 
Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 187–88 (1886); Brooklyn v. Ins. Co., 99 U.S. 362, 370 (1879). 
430. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733; see, e.g., Cooper v. Newell, 173 U.S. 555, 567 (1899) (citing 
Pennoyer’s discussion of the rules for federal courts, and leaving aside whether a state judgment 
“was entitled to any force in the State in which it was rendered”); Goldey v. Morning News, 156 
U.S. 518, 521 (1895) (“Whatever effect a constructive service may be allowed in the courts of the 
same government, it cannot be recognized as valid by the courts of any other government.”); Hart 
v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151, 155 (1884) (“The courts of the State might perhaps feel bound to give 
effect to the service made as directed by its statutes.”); Ins. Co. v. Bangs, 103 U.S. 435, 439 (1881) 
(Field, J.) (noting that “the State law cannot determine for the Federal courts what shall be deemed 
sufficient service of process,” though that “[i]t may be otherwise in the State courts”); see also St. 
Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 353 (1882) (describing the issue in Pennoyer as how “State courts 
[might] acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against non-residents which would be 
received as evidence in the Federal courts” (emphasis added)); cf. Conley v. Mathieson Alkali 
Works, 190 U.S. 406, 410–11 (1903) (relying on Goldey). 
431. See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 605 (1905) (holding that New York had no 
obligation to recognize a divorce decree, but “[w]ithout questioning the power of the State of 
Connecticut to enforce within its own borders the decree of divorce which is here in issue”); accord 
Grover & Baker Sewing Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287, 299 (1890).  But see Old Wayne 
Mut. Life Ass’n of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 15 (1907) (noting, in an interstate 
recognition case, that “no State can obtain in the tribunals of other jurisdictions full faith and credit 
for its judicial proceedings if they are wanting in the due process of law enjoined by the fundamental 
law”). 
432. E.g., Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 610 (1899) (“[T]he question for 
us to decide is whether [there] was a sufficient service to give jurisdiction to the [state] court over 
this corporation.  If it were, there was due process of law . . . .”); cf. Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 
193, 202–03 (1899) (determining a state’s jurisdiction to tax by analogy to Pennoyer’s principles, 
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making use of the Court’s then-mandatory jurisdiction to resolve the ongoing 
split;433 but the same could be said of other topics on which the law was far 
more settled.434  When the issue did come up, at least, the Court didn’t forget 
what Pennoyer had said a few years earlier; it simply wasn’t necessary to 
every decision. 
Third, while there was some resistance in the states, many courts did 
reconsider their prior decisions over time.435  Some applied the general-law 
standards as a matter of their own normal procedure;436 some repeated older 
language about judgments being received differently in and out of the state;437 
but many recognized that Pennoyer had fundamentally changed the process 
of review, even before the Court confirmed it in 1915.438  “Formerly,” the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey wrote in 1889, judgments pursuant to state 
statutes were “sometimes held to be enforceable in such state,” though the 
court had lacked personal jurisdiction “according to the general principles of 
law and justice,” and though the judgments “would not be recognized 
extraterritorially.  But now, by force of the addition to the federal constitution 
just adverted to, such judgment would be of no legal avail either at home or 
abroad.”439  Field couldn’t have put it better. 
IV. From Pennoyer to the Present Day 
When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, jurisdiction was 
governed by a complex interplay of general law, constitutional rules, and 
 
and holding that a tax without proper jurisdiction “would amount to the taking of property without 
due process of law, and would be a violation of the Federal Constitution”). 
433. See Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (establishing—for the first time—
discretionary Supreme Court certiorari review of certain federal judgments); see also Act of Feb. 13, 
1925 (The Judges’ Bill), ch. 229, § 1, sec. 237(b), 43 Stat. 936, 937 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (extending that discretion to many cases from state courts). 
434. See supra note 347 and accompanying text. 
435. See, e.g., Kemper-Thomas Paper Co. v. Shyer, 67 S.W. 856, 860 (Tenn. 1902) (“Since the 
deliverance of [Pennoyer] some of the states that had previously announced the distinction there 
reprehended and repudiated, have . . . overruled their former decisions to the contrary and adopted 
a rule in harmony with it.”). 
436. E.g., Amsbaugh v. Exch. Bank of Maquoketa, 5 P. 384, 386 (Kan. 1885). 
437. See, e.g., Pickett v. Ferguson, 45 Ark. 177, 192 (1885) (“Now, as Ferguson was neither 
personally summoned, nor voluntarily appeared in the Tennessee suit, and was not even a citizen of 
that state, no court sitting there could render any judgment against him which would be recognized 
elsewhere as of any validity. Such a judgment is treated in other jurisdictions as a mere nullity.”). 
438. See De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, 44 P. 345, 347–48 (Cal. 1896) (taking 
Pennoyer’s rule as “based upon a proposition of international law,” which now affected “the validity 
of [a] judgment within the state where rendered”); id. at 350 (McFarland, J., dissenting) (describing 
the invalidity of a judgment “even in the state where it was rendered” as “the main proposition 
decided by” the case, and one “which may, perhaps, be styled ‘modern’”); accord Denny v. Ashley, 
20 P. 331, 332 (Colo. 1889); Bickerdike v. Allen, 41 N.E. 740, 742 (Ill. 1895); Wilson v. Am. Palace 
Car Co. of N.J., 55 A. 997, 998–99 (N.J. 1903). 
439. Elasser v. Haines, 18 A. 1095, 1097 (N.J. 1889). 
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federal review.  It’s not surprising that these subtleties were lost over time.  
Today, personal jurisdiction is a topic in due process, with the Supreme Court 
regularly divining specific doctrines from a famously obscure text.  Those 
who find this practice legally arbitrary or otherwise unsatisfying might wish 
to look to an earlier model. 
This Article defends Pennoyer on original grounds.  Based on American 
law as it stood at the Founding, and as it’s been lawfully modified since, the 
reasoning of Pennoyer was and is legally correct.440  For some people, that’s 
defense enough.  But even those who reject originalism as a general approach 
might still hesitate to enforce “constitutional” restrictions with no better 
source than the pen of Chief Justice Stone.  After all, the current panoply of 
due process restrictions on state jurisdiction is widely disliked.441  So if 
personal jurisdiction doctrine is of the Court’s own invention, and if it can’t 
claim roots in an actual Fourteenth Amendment that was actually enacted, 
what is it good for?  Why not do something else—or let democratically 
elected legislators, whether in the states or in Congress, choose a different 
path? 
Indeed, the one clear result of returning to Pennoyer’s model would be 
a substantial increase in the power of Congress over state jurisdiction.  
Because due process requires jurisdiction, full stop, and because this federal 
question is answered in the last instance by a federal court, what matters is 
the federal view of who has authority over what.  To the extent that Congress 
has enumerated power to determine the federal view, the Due Process 
Clauses won’t stand in the way. 
Before Congress acts, of course, courts will still need to decide personal 
jurisdiction cases.  In the meantime, returning to the original law of personal 
jurisdiction might make less difference in practice than in theory.  The 
practices that constitute general and international law can change over time.  
It might be that today’s law of jurisdiction, even when reconstructed along 
these lines, would look more like International Shoe than like Pennoyer.  Or 
maybe not.  There are different ways of understanding the process of 
common-law change, and these in turn would have different implications for 
the unwritten requirements enforced by federal courts.  Odds are, though, that 
the result would be more determinate, more sensible, and in any case more 
legally sound than the doctrines we’ve got now. 
 
 
440. See generally Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 817 (2015) (describing this approach to constitutional law). 
441. See Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1301, 1304–05 (2014) (“The one thing jurisdiction scholars agree on is the sad state of 
personal jurisdiction law.”). 
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A. The Decline of General Law 
Pennoyer was partly a victim of its own success.  Its reasoning was 
based on the process of recognition.  Before Pennoyer, whatever jurisdiction 
a state asserted in its own courts could only be challenged in some other 
forum.  But once parties could raise their due process challenges in the 
rendering court, fewer cases had to wait for the recognition stage—and with 
the issue already litigated in one court, it couldn’t be relitigated in another.442 
That procedural change obscured a broad swath of substantive law—
such as the distinct roles of the 1790 Act and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
or the differences between Supreme Court and state-court review.  By the 
time of Hess v. Pawloski,443 the Court no longer relied on what Perdue calls 
the “awkward formulation” of whether “Massachusetts lacked legitimate 
authority [under other doctrines] and, as a result, enforcement of any 
subsequent judgment would have violated the Due Process Clause.”444  
Instead, the Court understandably described the issue as “whether the 
Massachusetts enactment contravenes the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”445  In other words, the Court spoke in shorthand—
and soon judges began to treat the shorthand as if it were substance.446  Rather 
than look to sources beyond the constitutional text, courts assumed that the 
Due Process Clause told them everything they needed to know.  Treating 
jurisdiction as a subfield of constitutional due process also made life easier 
for judges after Erie and Klaxon; jurisdiction was too important to be left up 
to state courts, but it didn’t have to be maintained as a prominent example of 
general law. 
As a topic in due process, and not general law, jurisdiction was highly 
susceptible to other trends in due process jurisprudence.  From the idea that 
“[t]he state is free to regulate the procedure of its courts . . . , unless in so 
doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,”447 it’s but a short 
step to the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”448 so 
central to International Shoe449—and from there to our current menagerie of 
 
442. See generally Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931). 
443. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
444. Perdue, Sovereignty, supra note 20, at 733. 
445. Hess, 274 U.S. at 355. 
446. See Brief of Professor Stephen E. Sachs as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 28, 
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, No. 16-405 (U.S. cert. granted Jan. 13, 2017). 
447. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
448. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). 
449. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 
463). 
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“minimum contacts,” “purposeful availment,” five-factor reasonableness, 
and so on.450  
But the details of the doctrine only mask deep divisions on the 
foundations.  Every Justice now on the Court might speak the same language 
of specific and general jurisdiction, but there’s no consensus on the animating 
principles behind these categories—leading to wild swings in doctrine over 
the past few years.451  Once we start searching for substantive criteria in the 
Due Process Clause, we’re bound to come up short—for only on the most 
heroic readings of the Clause is there anything in it for us to work with.  
(“Turn it over, and turn it over, for all is therein. . . .”)452  Without firm ground 
to build on, the Court seems to lurch from theory to theory as the mood 
strikes—citing convenience,453 fairness,454 federalism,455 liberty,456 
tradition,457 consent,458 or all of the above. 
B. Implications for Congress 
By treating the Due Process Clause as a font of substantive rules, the 
Court has seized control of the law of jurisdiction without any idea of what 
to do with it.  This is perhaps the exact opposite of the earlier, general-law 
model—on which courts were expected to leave the law in place, applying 
shared unwritten principles until the legislature said otherwise.  Were we to 
restore the original approach to jurisdiction, the most significant change 
wouldn’t be any particular substantive rule, but a reallocation of authority: 
between the courts and Congress, and between states and the federal 
government. 
Today we place federal courts in charge of articulating limits on state 
ones.  That makes it very hard to regulate fast-moving fields such as the 
Internet; legislatures can respond to new facts and make sensible-but-
undertheorized compromises without having to justify everything they do as 
 
450. Erbsen, supra note 29, at 3 (bemoaning the “catchphrases and buzzwords” that dominate 
jurisdiction doctrine). 
451. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760–61, 762 n.20 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.) 
(unexpectedly elevating the phrase “at home,” introduced without fanfare three years earlier in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011), into the primary test 
for general jurisdiction); see also id. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (noting the 
novelty of the Court’s rule). 
452. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 903 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(quoting 8 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD: SEDER NEZIKIN, Aboth 76–77 (I. Epstein ed. & trans., 
1935)). 
453. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223–24 (1957). 
454. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206, 212 (1977). 
455. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1980). 
456. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). 
457. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
458. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880–81 (2011) (Kennedy, J., 
plurality opinion). 
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having been dictated by the Fourteenth Amendment.  While that Amendment 
gives Congress an enforcement power,459 under current doctrine there’s not 
much Congress could do to vary (and, in particular, to weaken) the 
obligations the courts have imposed.  Even if we negotiated a broad 
multilateral treaty coordinating jurisdiction across nations, we still might be 
unable to sign it, should any of its terms be thought to depart from the Court’s 
current take on due process.460 
Under Pennoyer, though—putting concerns about notice to one 
side461—the Fourteenth Amendment only requires jurisdiction, full stop.  
When state judgments are challenged in federal courts, those courts will use 
any relevant sources of law to see if jurisdiction was present or absent.  The 
Constitution doesn’t limit those sources to general law.  It just so happens 
that, at the time of Pennoyer, the courts didn’t have anything else to work 
with.  But they could use other sources of law too, if we only had some way 
to provide them. 
As it turns out, we do.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause lets Congress 
“prescribe . . . the Effect” of “the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings” of the several states.462  As noted above, early Congresses 
repeatedly considered proposals to vary a judgment’s effect based on the 
source of its jurisdiction.463  If Congress were to tighten the reins on state 
courts, declaring that a judgment based on a certain kind of service should 
have no effect in any other forum, then a federal court considering that 
judgment would have to conclude that it indeed had no effect, whatever the 
general law might say.  And if the judgment were legally ineffective, its use 
against an individual’s liberty or property would violate due process. 
Alternatively, if Congress wanted to expand the reach of state courts, it 
could pass a statute defining additional grounds on which to recognize a state 
judgment as valid.  Because statutes outrank general law—and because 
federal statutes, if constitutional, are supreme law—the federal courts would 
necessarily give such a judgment its full effect.  The same thing could happen 
through a self-executing treaty, made by the President with the Senate’s 
consent.  (Or, perhaps, an interstate compact made with Congress’s 
consent,464 which commanded each state’s citizens to attend the other’s 
courts.)  In this way, a judgment that might be questionable under general 
law can be declared valid by statute or treaty, whether in a state’s own courts 
or in the federal courts.  And if the judgment itself is legally valid, then 
 
459. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
460. See Stanley E. Cox, Why Properly Construed Due Process Limits on Personal Jurisdiction 
Must Always Trump Contrary Treaty Provisions, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1177, 1186 (1998) (discussing 
whether “properly construed due process limits can be trumped by reasonably negotiated treaties”). 
461. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). 
462. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
463. See supra notes 279–85 and accompanying text. 
464. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
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there’d be no particular reason to suspect that the deprivations it orders would 
violate due process: such deprivations would only occur, as far as any federal 
court could tell, pursuant to the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. 
In other words, though constitutional due process is still involved, the 
federal government has essentially free rein to set jurisdictional doctrine for 
the states.  The Fourteenth Amendment still plays a crucial role; without it, 
there’d be no way to challenge an exorbitant judgment in the rendering court, 
whatever Congress might say about recognition in any other forum.  But the 
Due Process Clause gives teeth to Congress’s pronouncements, entitling 
defendants to challenge jurisdiction without waiting for the recognition stage. 
Congress also has free rein to regulate jurisdiction in the federal system.  
The Supreme Court has suggested that the Fifth Amendment might limit 
federal courts in much the same way that the Fourteenth Amendment limits 
state courts.465  But as Pennoyer saw things, that may not be right.  Again, all 
that due process requires is jurisdiction, full stop.  Under the Tribunals 
Clause466 or the Necessary and Proper Clause,467 Congress might confer 
personal jurisdiction on lower federal courts in an enormous range of cases—
summoning “a subject of England, or France, or Russia . . . from the other 
end of the globe to obey our process.”468  That might annoy our friends 
abroad, but it’d be fully effective at home, overriding any general-law rules 
to the contrary.  In so doing, it’d also eliminate any potential Fifth 
Amendment objections: the court would have had jurisdiction according to 
federal law, and the judgment of a competent court is a paradigmatic example 
of due process.469  The scope of federal power abroad, like the scope of state 
power at home, would be decided by our elected representatives—and not 
divined, or perhaps manufactured, from an unyielding Due Process Clause. 
C. Implications for Courts 
Waiting for statutes can take quite a while.  To date, Congress has 
regulated state-court jurisdiction in only a handful of cases.470  Perhaps it’d 
act more quickly if its authority were widely acknowledged; but the courts 
 
465. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987) (leaving 
as an open question whether “a federal court could exercise personal jurisdiction, consistent with 
the Fifth Amendment, based on an aggregation of the defendant’s contacts with the Nation as a 
whole”). 
466. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
467. Id. cl. 18. 
468. Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 613 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 
11,134). 
469. See Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and “Purposeful Availment”: A Reassessment of 
Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 455, 471 (2004) (“[O]ne might 
reasonably conclude that with respect to the questions of allocation of sovereign authority between 
the United States and other nations, the Constitution does not constrain at all.”). 
470. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738A–1738B (2012) (child custody and child support 
determinations). 
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have to decide cases in the meantime.  So if we wished, for whatever reason, 
to leave the wilderness of modern due process and to return to the original 
model of personal jurisdiction, what would the courts do differently? 
In some areas, the answers are easy.  Courts would continue to scrutinize 
state judgments under the Due Process Clause—this time for compliance 
with the general law, not as it stood in 1878, but as it stands today.  The goal 
is identifying existing standards, not building rationalist castles in the air.  
Courts might also look to international practice for these standards, but only 
to the extent that it still coheres with American practice. 
The harder questions involve identifying those practices, especially after 
many decades in which practice abroad has become less uniform and judges 
have muddied the record at home.  How can we tell what the existing practice 
is, if the courts have for many decades been doing something else?  How is 
it even possible for “the existing practice” to be something other than what’s 
currently done?  As it turns out, these practices can exist at more than one 
level, and many jurisdictional practices are still recognized as shared.  
Despite decades of neglect, general law may still have something to offer us. 
And when the answers do remain vague, a renewed focus on general law 
may also help clarify which considerations have greatest weight.  If 
jurisdiction’s substantive standards were emanations of the Due Process 
Clause, it might make sense to focus on the “liberty” of the defendant.  But 
once attention moves to general law, it becomes easier to see why 
sovereignty—a concept found nowhere in the Clause’s text—might be 
jurisdiction’s definitive concern. 
 1. Easy Answers.—Rejecting the modern due process theory doesn’t 
mean that courts should “abandon” the enforcement of jurisdictional rules;471 
nor should they “stop supervising jurisdiction under the Due Process 
Clause.”472  Due process really does require lawful jurisdiction, so federal 
courts should still take a hard look at state-court judgments, even without any 
legislative guidance. 
At the same time, returning to a general-law model wouldn’t mean 
simply resetting the clock to 1878.  General law is customary law, and custom 
can change over time—even due to actions that once violated the custom.  
(Think of spelling or grammar rules, which routinely evolve due to routine 
violations.)  Should today’s generally accepted standards of jurisdiction look 
more like International Shoe than Pennoyer,473 it wouldn’t matter if these 
customs had changed partly due to judicial influences, which themselves 
resulted from mistakes about the Due Process Clause.  Alternatively, it’s 
 
471. Borchers, supra note 1, at 20. 
472. Conison, supra note 3, at 1205. 
473. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 421 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (describing a highly flexible regime of jurisdiction to adjudicate). 
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possible that the general rules of Pennoyer’s day might still be in force today; 
but that requires further argument. 
What courts would give up would be the general approach of 
International Shoe and its progeny, of requiring each remaining “traditional 
practice” to conform to a court’s “[f]reeform notions of fundamental 
fairness.”474  Such practices may seem out of keeping with the times.  But 
when it comes to general law, the fact that “so it was laid down in the time 
of Henry IV”475 is an excellent reason for courts to continue to apply the 
longstanding rule, letting Congress decide whether and when to change it.  In 
that respect, Burnham v. Superior Court476 is an easy case, notwithstanding 
its widespread disapproval among academics.477  Tag jurisdiction would be 
permissible as “the practice of, not only a substantial number of the States, 
but as far as we are aware all the States and the Federal Government.”478 
Likewise, the insistence in Shaffer v. Heitner479 that existing rules of in 
rem jurisdiction pass “the same test of ‘fair play and substantial justice,’”480 
or the more recent insistence in some courts that “older precedent” on 
corporate consent give way to new theories of general jurisdiction,481 would 
both be out of place.  Again, it might turn out that either of these requirements 
just happens to conform to the modern practice.  But that, too, requires further 
argument. 
At the same time, courts should be careful about treating any 
international practice as the currently accepted one, no matter how many 
familiar American precedents it disrupts.482  As under Swift, widely shared 
rules are sometimes displaced by local customs,483 much the way that 
American English diverges from that spoken elsewhere; it was clear even in 
Story’s day that the common law could develop its own conflicts principles 
 
474. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011) (Kennedy, J., plurality 
opinion). 
475. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
476. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
477. See, e.g., Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially over International Defendants: 
Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593. 
478. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 615 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
479. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
480. Id. at 207. 
481. Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 145 (Del. 2016) (applying Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014)); see also id. at 145 n.19 (citing similar decisions). 
482. See, e.g., Perdue, supra note 469, at 462 (arguing that American notions of “purposeful 
availment” are “noticeably absent” abroad, where “effects or harm within the country is generally 
sufficient”); Russell J. Weintraub, An Objective Basis for Rejecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22 
RUTGERS L.J. 611, 612 (1991) (arguing that tag jurisdiction “is contrary to the consensus of civilized 
nations and . . . may violate international law”). 
483. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842) (noting that, in any particular 
jurisdiction, a “local usage” might displace general principles of law). 
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as distinct from international norms.484  If American practice has knowingly 
departed from international custom (say, by treating in-state service as 
sufficient), then in case of such a conflict, the American practice would 
control. 
 2. Harder Questions.—The more difficult problems for courts involve 
areas where the shared system of rules has broken down over time.  
International practice, for example, is less clear than it used to be.  Some 
authorities argue that there is no international law of jurisdiction—that the 
opprobrium directed at well-known examples of exorbitant jurisdiction, such 
as jurisdiction based on the plaintiff’s nationality, is nowadays a matter only 
of international comity and no longer one of international law.485  Should this 
prove correct, though, the distinction between law and comity might turn out 
not to be as pressing as it seems—so long as there’s substantial agreement on 
which exercises of jurisdiction are truly exorbitant.486  If a federal court 
would hold a given foreign judgment invalid, as too jurisdictionally fishy for 
international comity to save, then the same judgment would be properly held 
invalid if it were issued by a state court instead.  All that matters is whether 
the relevant standards are well-defined enough to be applied by courts; if so, 
then the state courts can still be required (through the “hook” of due process 
and appellate review) to adhere to the federal courts’ view of things.   
On the domestic side, absent legislative intervention, the crucial 
question is determining what counts as American practice.  One approach 
might look to Nelson’s account of general law—as based on “how most states 
do things,” and not “whatever the policymakers in one particular state have 
said.”487  In that case, the minimum-contacts test, the purposeful-availment 
rule, and so on might all continue uninterrupted, as reflections of an 
American practice that acknowledges but still departs from international 
rules. 
But another approach looks to a different kind of American practice—
to our practice of attributing certain rules to the general common law of 
 
484. See STORY, supra note 157, § 241, at 201 (describing the difference of opinion between 
“foreign jurists” and “the common law” on capacity to contract). 
485. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 302, reporters’ note 1 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (“With the exception of sovereign 
immunity, . . . modern customary international law generally does not impose limits on jurisdiction 
to adjudicate.”); see also William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2071, 2123 (2015) (“[N]o customary international law rule prohibiting the exercise of 
[exorbitant] jurisdictional bases has emerged.”).  But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. 2, ch. 2, intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1987) (“The exercise 
of jurisdiction by courts of one state that affects interests of other states is now generally considered 
as coming within the domain of customary international law and international agreement.”). 
486. See Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 ME. L. REV. 473, 
475 (2006) (suggesting that “the world’s different bases of exorbitant jurisdiction are, in essence, 
not as different as they appear”). 
487. Nelson, supra note 16, at 503–04. 
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jurisdiction, bypassing those rules we attribute to the Due Process Clause 
instead.  This approach treats jurisdiction much the way the Multistate Bar 
Exam treats criminal law:488 it identifies the rules we conventionally preface 
with “at common law . . . ,” such as that burglary must be of a dwelling 
house489 or that voluntary intoxication is no defense.490  In this sense, we can 
all agree on what the shared common-law rule is—the one that would obtain 
absent legislative or judicial intervention—even though we also know that it 
may no longer be what’s regularly done. 
These rules, too, can change over time.  The common law of intoxication 
was different at the end of the nineteenth century than at the beginning,491 
just as the common law of contract was different under Mansfield than it had 
been under Holt.492  But these were changes internal to the common law, not 
separate impositions by statute.  As the Supreme Court envisioned it in 
United States v. Chambers,493 the prevailing rule of common law is 
something distinct from a restatement of the prevailing statute law—
especially when the governing statutes “themselves recognize the principle 
which would obtain in their absence.”494  (In the same way, it’d be error to 
take the customary practice of European states to be whatever European 
Union members have agreed to by treaty and legislation.)495 
This approach wouldn’t be without its critics.  Maybe we can’t say what 
jurisdiction would be like without International Shoe, because we can’t even 
imagine the legal contours of that world.  Unlike statutes modifying the 
common law of burglary, court decisions construing (or misconstruing) the 
Due Process Clause aren’t conscious stand-ins for a specific alternative that 
might be revived at any moment.  Maybe the general-law practice has long 
since broken up, and International Shoe is all we have. 
On the other hand, maybe the best way to describe the Court’s twentieth-
century case law really is as the imposition of separate standards on 
Pennoyer-era practices, rather than the growth and development of that 
particular customary tradition into something new.  Or some of each; maybe 
a few of the early post-Pennoyer cases were still toiling in the fields of the 
 
488. See Daniel J. Solove, The Multistate Bar Exam as a Theory of Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1403, 1406 n.10 (2006) (commenting on the fact that the Multistate Bar Exam employs “archaic 
common law definitions of crimes” that have long since been “supplanted with statutory law”). 
489. Note, A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 1009, 1009 (1951). 
490. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1996) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) 
(describing early common-law beliefs about voluntary intoxication). 
491. Jerome Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1048–49 
(1944). 
492. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 350–51 (4th ed. 2002). 
493. 291 U.S. 217 (1934). 
494. Id. at 226; cf. Baude & Sachs, supra note 127, at 1108–09 (discussing Chambers). 
495. Cf. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 909 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(comparing the American law of personal jurisdiction to the European Court of Justice’s 
interpretation of particular EU regulations). 
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general-law tradition, while later cases superadded distinct standards of due 
process.  If so, then perhaps the removal of these separate standards might 
leave the early twentieth-century service rules—with their unfashionable 
emphasis on presence, citizenship, and consent—as the last standing default. 
Developing a full theory of common-law change—and successfully 
applying it to the twentieth-century history of personal jurisdiction—is 
somewhat beyond this Article’s scope.  But even a partial theory, to be 
developed further in future work, can still make a real difference.  
Understanding jurisdiction as general law would have a real impact over and 
above any revisions it makes to specific doctrines.  The judge’s task wouldn’t 
be to find the best theory of due process, to reconcile ancient traditions with 
fundamental fairness, and so on, but to issue the ruling most consistent with 
our existing practices.  That may be more of a change of tone and emphasis 
than a change in substance, at least at first.  But it could have substantial 
effect on the development of the doctrine over time—making it both more 
predictable and more determinate, in the long run, than the Court’s 
continuing efforts to rationalize the law.   
3. Refocusing on Sovereignty.—Reviving Pennoyer offers no guarantee 
of doctrinal certainty.  The general law of jurisdiction is only as determinate 
as it is;496 and neither the general law, nor the customary international law 
that it incorporates, has any great reputation for clarity.  But these bodies of 
law do have one extremely important feature: a sensible connection to the 
allocation of sovereign power. 
Under Pennoyer, due process requires jurisdiction, full stop, with the 
actual jurisdictional standards supplied by other sources of law.  This fact 
helps us resolve the oft-repeated conflict of “sovereignty” and “liberty” that’s 
long occupied the courts.497  Due process requires a lawful judgment before 
liberty or property is taken, and our notions of sovereignty are necessarily 
connected to our convictions about which judgments are lawful. 
Indeed, it’s hard to see how the field could be about anything else.498  
Personal jurisdiction doctrines are “inescapably political”;499 they regulate 
the exercise of power by some people over others.  Jurisdiction isn’t about 
where litigation takes place—and it hasn’t been since at least 1794, when the 
Supreme Court barred a French consul from hearing admiralty claims on U.S. 
 
496. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483 (2014) (cautioning against views of law as inherently rule-like). 
497. Compare, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880–81 (2011) 
(Kennedy, J., plurality opinion), with id. at 899–900 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
498. See generally Allan Erbsen, Reorienting Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine Around 
Horizontal Federalism Rather than Liberty After Walden v. Fiore, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 769 
(2015) (arguing for such a reorientation). 
499. Stein, supra note 23, at 692. 
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soil.500  If geographic convenience were all we cared about, we could have 
had the consul hear claims in people’s living rooms.501  
Instead, jurisdiction is about who gets to decide.502  It’s about choosing 
the group of people who get to choose the judges, to write the rules of 
procedure and evidence, to supply the jury—that is, to dispose of “all [the 
defendants’] worldly goods,”503 and often their liberty to boot.  In particular, 
because jurisdiction includes the power to come to the wrong judgment,504 
it’s about choosing the people who have power to make the wrong choices 
on all these counts and who have the right to see their choices enforced 
anyway. 
Perhaps because the right answers are so hard to find, and the temptation 
to throw in the towel so great, jurisdiction scholars sometimes downplay the 
importance of their subject—suggesting, for instance, that the only really 
meaningful aspect of personal jurisdiction is its effect on choice of law.505  
But there’d be no point in getting excited over procedural issues—over the 
election of judges,506 over pleading standards,507 over the scope of class 
actions,508 over the treatment of sexual assault victims on the witness stand,509 
and so on—if our political process had no effect on the answers, and if anyone 
could just as easily sue or be sued in some other forum with any or none of 
these rules. 
Each of these topics involves the exercise of political power over 
defendants, because the defendant doesn’t choose the forum.  Courts 
sometimes explain this exercise through a framework of consent or voluntary 
submission;510 but that’s merely tacit consent, a well-known “quagmire” of 
 
500. Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794). 
501. Sachs, supra note 441, at 1311. 
502. See id. at 1303 (identifying the crucial questions regarding personal jurisdiction as ones 
about “not where, but who”); see also Erbsen, supra note 498, at 772 (“[M]odern personal 
jurisdiction doctrine conflates two distinct questions: (1) where may litigation occur, and (2) which 
governments may authorize litigation.”). 
503. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 623 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
504. See Baude, supra note 145, at 1831 (“[J]udgments closed disputes even when they were 
wrong, but only when there was jurisdiction. . . .  The lawfulness of judicial action in a given case 
depended on the authority of the judge, not the reasons for judgment.”). 
505. See, e.g., Drobak, supra note 24, at 1058 (stressing that personal jurisdiction requirements 
function as a limit on choice of law); Redish, supra note 8, at 1139 (suggesting that jurisdictional 
limits are the results of states’ desires to achieve their policy goals by having their substantive law 
control the outcomes of cases). 
506. See Sandra Day O’Connor, Opinion, Take Justice Off the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/opinion/23oconnor.html [https://perma.cc/BR7T-
PT5D] (arguing that the direct election of state court judges should be replaced with a “merit 
selection system”). 
507. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
508. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
509. See FED. R. EVID. 412. 
510. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011) (Kennedy, J., plurality 
opinion) (“A person may submit to a State’s authority in a number of ways.”). 
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political theory.511  What exactly does a British metal-shearer manufacturer 
have to do to become subject to the will of the American people, or to those 
of New Jersey in particular?  As Perdue writes, “[t]he problem of political 
legitimacy has troubled philosophers for centuries,”512 and it’s unlikely that 
any convincing theory will finally be developed in the U.S. Reports, between 
the first Monday in October and the last day of June.513 
This is where the general law of jurisdiction can help.  For a workable 
jurisdictional doctrine, we don’t need a philosophically correct theory of 
political obligation—any more than we need actually correct policy in any 
other area of the law.  The law usually serves as a means of conventional 
settlement, something “on which society (mostly) agrees and which allow[s] 
us (mostly) to get along.”514  With regard to political authority, some of our 
conventional settlement is found in international law, the amorphous body of 
customs and practices that allocate authority among sovereign nations; within 
the United States, much of the rest is found in general-law principles.  To the 
extent that there are any shared rules about judicial jurisdiction—and this is 
not to assume that there will be any, or any at the level of specificity we 
need—the principles of general and international law seem like good places 
to start. 
After all, everyone believes in some limits on a state’s territorial 
authority.  Jurisdiction to execute a judgment usually ends at the border; one 
state shouldn’t send its judicial marshals to seize persons or property within 
the territory of another.  Yet sovereign borders, too, are a form of 
conventional settlement of questions of political authority.  They serve as 
arbitrary dividing lines, and they only work to the extent that people agree on 
them.  Where people disagree, borders cease to be useful—say, in the East 
China Sea.515  But where borders do work, they help answer what might 
otherwise be theoretically insoluble questions: which groups of people 
should rule over which other groups, which decisions should be made in 
Washington or in Mexico City, and so on.  Courts could always try to think 
up better answers, like colonial administrators offhandedly redrawing maps, 
but there are also plenty of reasons why they shouldn’t.  Finding the current 
conventional answers is not only easier than finding true ones—it may also 
be more suitable for a judge’s role. 
 
511. Perdue, supra note 25, at 537. 
512. Id. at 546. 
513. See Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 
293, 308 (1987) (“United States Reports is hardly an adequate forum for philosophical debate.”). 
514. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 127, at 1096; see also id. at 1096–07 (“We don’t have an 
inherent ‘just is’ law of narcotics, either, but judges don’t handle drug cases by making their own 
first-order normative decisions.”). 
515. See generally MARK E. MANYIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE SENKAKUS 
(DIAOYU/DIAOYUTAI) DISPUTE: U.S. TREATY OBLIGATIONS (2016), http://www 
.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUN6-9LBG] (describing the dispute between 
Japan and China regarding islands in the East China Sea and the United States’ role therein). 
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Conclusion 
That Pennoyer got it right is more than a historical debating point.  The 
American law of personal jurisdiction is an intellectual shambles.  If there’s 
a half-coherent alternative, defensible on original grounds, that should be 
seen as good news.  If this alternative is moderately helpful in achieving other 
goals, like modernizing jurisdictional doctrine by statute, so much the better. 
That alternative, it turns out, is the much-mocked notion of general law, 
together with the long-despised decision in Pennoyer.  Other scholars have 
discussed jurisdiction with general law before, but they’ve generally thought 
that it proved Pennoyer wrong.516  In fact, recovering the model of general 
law is crucial to understanding why Pennoyer got things right. 
More importantly, recovering this model points the way to other areas 
of the law we might better understand, once we let the scales of Erie and 
Klaxon fall from our eyes.  To some scholars, because jurisdiction is “part of 
the law of conflicts, Erie and Klaxon undermined the case for continued 
federal court supervision” of the subject.517  The same argument would ring 
hollow as applied to state borders, where federal supervision seems vital to 
the constitutional plan.  One person’s modus ponens being another’s reductio, 
we might with equal justice say that the case for federal supervision of state 
personal jurisdiction has undermined the case for Erie and Klaxon. 
Erie’s reasoning depends crucially on the impossibility—the 
“fallacy”—of general law.518  Yet general law is not only possible, but 
indispensable.  State-court jurisdiction is just one topic, and far from the only 
one, as to which our Constitution was designed in light of general law.  Many 
areas that are crucial to a federal system go unaddressed in our constitutional 
text: choice of law, jurisdiction to tax, extraterritoriality, interstate and 
international relations, and so on.  That may or may not have been a deliberate 
choice, but it also wasn’t really an oversight.  These areas weren’t left to 




516. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 1, at 20, 22–24 (arguing that the Court should “abandon the 
notion that state court personal jurisdiction is a matter of constitutional law” and attributing the 
“constitutionalization of American personal jurisdiction” to Pennoyer and its progeny).  See 
generally Conison, supra note 3, at 1135–39 (characterizing Pennoyer as unjustifiedly breaking 
with a prior tradition). 
517. Conison, supra note 3, at 1183. 
518. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938); see Michael Steven Green, Erie’s 
Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1119 (2011); Sachs, supra note 74 (manuscript at 47) 
(arguing that the “whole logic” of Erie “unravels” once one recognizes that a state court could 
decide cases by finding general law instead of making state law). 
519. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (Jackson, J.). 
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system of law—the entire purpose of which is to lie in reserve, answering 
questions that other sources of law have left open. 
After so many years under Erie, it takes a great effort just to understand 
how our own legal system was supposed to work.  Recovering the general 
law of jurisdiction might be a good first step. 
 
